Zimbabwe National Army

"ZNA" redirects here. For the airport with IATA code ZNA, see Nanaimo Harbour Water Airport.
Zimbabwe National Army

National Army Flag
Active 18 April 1980 – present
(36 years, 7 months)
Country  Zimbabwe
Allegiance Zimbabwe Defence Forces
Type Army
Size 29,000 Active personnel
21,800 Reserve personnel
50,800 total[1]
Part of Joint High Command (1980-1981)
Joint Operations Command (1981-present)
Motto(s) "Our swords are the shield of the nation"[2]
Colors Green, Yellow         
Anniversaries Defence Forces Day (12 August)[3]
Engagements

Military history of Zimbabwe

Website www.ZNA.gov
Commanders
Commander in chief President Robert Mugabe
Chief of the Army Lt. Gen. Philip Valerio Sibanda
Chief of Staff, GS Maj. Gen. Trust Mugova
Notable
commanders

Vitalis Zvinavashe
Solomon Mujuru

The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) is the primary branch of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces responsible for land-oriented military operations. It is the largest service branch under the Zimbabwean Joint Operations Command (JOC). The modern army has its roots in the Rhodesian Army, which was raised between 1963 and 1964 after the breakup of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.[4] A Joint High Command created in March 1980 to oversee integration of the formerly belligerent Rhodesian Security Forces, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) officially established the Zimbabwe National Army in late 1980, nearly a year after the end of the Rhodesian Bush War.[5]

The mission statement of the army is "to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests of Zimbabwe and to contribute to international peace and security".[2] It is considered an integral component of the JOC, and falls under the ultimate authority of the President of Zimbabwe. The ZNA is directed by a Chief of the Army, the senior official being an Army Chief of Staff. Zimbabwe's highest ranking army officer is currently General Engelbert Rugeje. In 2011, Harare continued to maintain a statutory strength of 40,000 active personnel; actual numbers hover closer to 30,000.[6] ZNA reserves claim another 21,800, putting the combined component strength total at approximately 50,800.[1]

History

Origins

The origins of the Zimbabwe National Army lie in the formation of the Southern Rhodesia Volunteers in 1898, a mounted corps supported by bicycles, a signal troop, and engineers. Raised by colonial authorities to suppress further uprisings after the Second Matabele War, it included a "Western division" and an "Eastern division" staffed by European volunteers. Field outings were conducted in concert with the British South Africa Police (BSAP).[7]

In the 1890s, the nature of this force changed following the outbreak of the Second Boer War. In 1899, the Royal Rhodesia Regiment was founded, and by the time Salisbury joined the Central African Federation there were three battalions.[8] As Southern Rhodesia was the dominant territory in the federation, its officers represented the senior commanders in charge of all federal units. During this period Southern Rhodesians served overseas on active duty for the British Empire, most notably in Malaya, Kuwait, and Aden.[9]

When the federation was dissolved in 1963, Southern Rhodesia retained the personnel raised in its territory, including the largest proportion of white soldiers - some 3,400 of the 7,000 men who served in the defunct Federal Army.[4] Over objections raised by newly independent African governments in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi), it also claimed the majority of armoured vehicles and the potent strike aircraft of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force.[10]

Recruitment and training for an insurgent campaign against the colony's administration by rival African nationalists from the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) began in 1963, and intensified after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.[11] The Rhodesian Bush War, which lasted roughly fifteen years until late 1979, resulted in the creation of two major insurgent armies, expansion of the Rhodesian Army, and militarisation of local society.[4] By 1980 there were an estimated 150,000 Zimbabweans with military training or experience, access to arms, and allegiance to an established political organisation.[12] Conscription had been introduced in 1955, and the National Service Act in 1976 provided for 12 months of full-time military service regardless of rank. Three-year reservist obligations for white, Coloured, and Asian males also continued.[13] Personnel strength of the regular army peaked at 20,000 active members (half of them whites) and 2,300 with the air force. The paramilitary BSAP had 11,000 police and a reserve of 35,000. These uniform commands and others - including 20,000 Security Force Auxiliaries loyal to interim politicians and a 3,500-man Guard Force for securing protected villages - fell under the authority of Combined Operations (ComOps), headed by Lieutenant-General Peter Walls.[11]

Integration

The Zimbabwe National Army was formed in 1980 from elements of the Rhodesian Army, integrated to a greater or lesser extent with combatants from the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrilla movements (the armed wings of, respectively, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).[14]

Following majority rule in April 1980 and the cantonment of the ZANLA and ZIPRA under Operation Agila, British Army trainers (the British Military Advisory and Training Team, BMATT) oversaw the integration of guerrilla fighters into one unified army.[15] A battalion structure was overlaid on the existing Rhodesian Army. For the first year a system was followed where the top-performing candidate became battalion commander. If he or she was from ZANLA, then his or her second-in-command was the top-performing ZIPRA candidate, and vice versa. This ensured a balance between the two movements in the command structure. From early 1981 this system was abandoned in favour of political appointments, and ZANLA/ZANU fighters consequently quickly formed the majority of battalion commanders in the ZNA.

The ZNA was originally formed into four brigades, 1 Brigade, Matabeleland, 2 Brigade, Mashonaland, 3 Brigade, Manicaland, and 4 Brigade, Masavingo.[16] These comprised a total of 29 battalions. The brigade support units were composed almost entirely of specialists of the former Rhodesian Army, while unintegrated battalions of the Rhodesian African Rifles were assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 4th Brigades. A North Korean-trained 5th was formed in 1981 and was used in genocidal operations against dissidents and their sustainers who were mostly of the Ndebele-ethnic group in Matabeleland.[17][18]

The ZNA is under the command of Lieutenant General Philip Valerio Sibanda, who took over from General Constantine Chiwenga following his elevation to the post of Commander Zimbabwe Defence Forces in December 2003.

Operations

Mozambique Civil War

Raids on Gorongosa

Some Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) elements had crossed from Mozambique into Zimbabwe several times, had robbed some shops along the border and had burned down a timber factory. After several meetings with Mozambican officials it was agreed that the ZDF could pursue into Mozambique any RENAMO elements that might have raided Zimbabwe. This was the basis on which the ZDF started planning follow-up operations which took them deep into Mozambique culminating in occupation of former RENAMO bases at Gorongosa.

Operation Lemon

The first of these Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) follow-up operations was launched from Katiyo and Aberdeen in northern Manicaland, code-named Operation Lemon. The operation lasted from the 5–9 December 1984. It comprised elements of 3 Brigade, the Parachute Group, Special Air Service (SAS), and was supported by the Air Force of Zimbabwe (AFZ). Bad weather conditions and the difficult mountainous terrain reduced the use of aircraft, and all the trooping had to be done by helicopters. The movement of troops on the ground was also difficult. Four contacts were made and two RENAMO bases were destroyed. However, most RENAMO elements in the bases managed to escape and only eight were captured.

The ZDF considered this operation as a major failure and the code word Lemon was corrupted to mean any failure in all subsequent operations. It was further established that there were no other permanent bases in the area, only some advance posts and temporary bases used by RENAMO as launching pads for food raids into Zimbabwe. It was also revealed for the first time that the main RENAMO bases were at Messinse, Chito, Nyazonia, Buetoni, Gorongosa Central Base and Casa Banana.

Operation Grape Fruit

The report for Operation Lemon was taken seriously by the commanders of the ZDF, and in July 1985 preparations for major offensive operations were started. Rehearsals for a Fireforce operation were carried out at Inkomo Barracks near Harare. Three infantry brigades were mobilised together with the Parachute Group, One Commando Battalion and the AFZ. Men and equipment were moved to Chimoio in Mozambique, with a Forward Replenishment Point (FRP) being established at Grand Reef near Mutare.

Intelligence sources had indicated that RENAMO's main regional base in Manica province was at Muxamba and that Casa Banana was the national stronghold of RENAMO. Both bases had to be attacked and Muxamba was targeted first, being only 70 kilometres south of Chimoio. The most important consideration however, was the hope that activities around Muxamba might divert RENAMO's attention from monitoring too closely the movement of the three heavily armed Zimbabwean infantry battalions marching from Chimoio towards the Gorongosa Mountains.

Muxamba was believed to hold at least 400 RENAMO elements commanded by Major General Mabachi. The attack on Muxamba was launched on the 20th of August 1985 by elements of 3 Brigade, supported by the Parachute Group and the AFZ. The operation went on for four days with minor problems for the ZDF. One helicopter was riddled with small arms fire but managed to return to Chimoio.

Raid on Cassa Banana

Intelligence sources had indicated that Cassa Banana, RENAMO's national headquarters had a strength of 400 elements. However, the organisation maintained a string of other smaller bases along the Gorongosa Mountains, which were considered as part of the main base. This raised the total estimated strength in the area to 1 000 elements. During the night of 27 August 1985, three Zimbabwe infantry battalions were established in their Form Up Points (FUP) with the help of the SAS and Commando elements. At Chimoio a Fireforce was being given final briefing, and five AFZ planes were given orders for a first light take-off for Gorongosa on the morning of 28 August.

Although the RENAMO elements captured at Katiyo had given a grid reference for Cassa Banana, further intelligence had cast some doubt as to which of the several RENAMO bases scattered on all sides of the Gorongosa Mountains was the actual headquarters of RENAMO. It was because of this uncertainty that the Fireforce was divided into three sections each with one helicopter gunship, two transport helicopters and two transport aircraft with paratroopers.

Each Fireforce section was detailed to attack specific suspected RENAMO positions around the Gorongossa Mountains. It was during this three pronged attack that one helicopter flew overhead Cassa Banana airstrip and the pilot noticed a green pickup truck disappearing into some bushes. It was then that the pilot recognised the place as that given at the briefing as Cassa Banana. The jets from Thornhill, which were already in place overhead a predetermined Initial Point (IP), were then talked on to the target, and the raid on Cassa Banana began.

The aircraft attacked the target, knocking out several Anti-Aircraft gun positions. Two helicopter gunships continued to hit suspected strategic positions and managed to flash out several pockets of resistance. A third helicopter was directing the dropping of the first wave of paratroopers. When the paratroopers had entered the base, the infantry battalions, which were close by, were ordered to move in and occupy strategic positions. The Fireforce then moved on to deal with the several pockets of resistance from the smaller RENAMO bases all along the Gorongosa Mountains. It took the whole day to silence all of these pockets of resistance.

There is no official Zimbabwean record of the number of casualties on the first raid on Cassa Banana. However, considering the amount of effort, the numbers of troops involved on both sides, and the time it took to capture the base, there must have been a lot of deaths and injuries on both sides.[19]

Operation Lifeline-Tete Corridor

This corridor is a tarred 263-kilometre road running from Nyamapanda on the Zimbabwean border through the Mozambican city of Tete to Zobue on the Malawi border. After UDI in 1965, this route carried Rhodesian goods to and from Malawi, which had not applied United Nations sanctions against the Smith regime. After the independence of Mozambique in 1975, the bulk of Malawi's trade with South Africa went through Rhodesia by road via Tete. It was only in 1984 that trade via this route declined because of RENAMO attacks.

It was in the wake of these developments that in June 1984 the governments of Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe formed a joint security committee 13. The aim of the committee was to monitor operations on a day-to-day basis and to attempt to remove all security threats along the Tete Corridor. Zimbabwe's First Mechanised Battalion was ordered to move into Mozambique and they established their headquarters in Tete thereby securing the strategic bridge crossing the Zambezi River. In 1985, President Samora Machel of Mozambique formally requested the governments of Tanzania and Zimbabwe to contribute troops for "the restoration of law and order" in Mozambique. This led to the deployment of Tanzanian troops north of the Zambezi river and Zimbabwean troops to the south.

The decision to send Zimbabwean troops to help restore law and order in Mozambique was partly influenced by Zimbabwe's close relationship with the Mozambican government which dates back to FRELIMO's assistance during Zimbabwe's war of liberation. There was also the underlying fact that FRELIMO and ZANU shared a common Marxist ideology of scientific socialism. The South Africa-backed RENAMO professed to be an anti-communist movement, as did Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement, which was fighting against the Marxist MPLA government of Angola. There was thus an ideological alliance of the Maputo - Harare - Luanda axis, with support for these governments from the Soviet Union. The fact that the United States of America was providing covert and overt support to opposition movements such as UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique reflected the extension of the Cold War to Southern Africa.

Angola

After several hints,[20][21] some of which the Zimbabwean Government denied, for the first time the ZDF Commander, General Constantine Chiwenga, acknowledged ZNA involvement in the Angolan Civil War.[22]

It was reported that Zimbabwe had more than 2,000 combat troops, including 20 military intelligence officers, deployed in Angola whose presence has helped the Angolan Armed Forces to overrun Jonas Savimbi's strongholds, according to reports reaching the Zimbabwe Independent.[23]

Somalia (UNOSOM II)

Zimbabwe deployed, initially, an infantry company group of 163 personnel under Maj. Vitalis Chigume to Somalia as a national contribution to the UN mission UNOSOM II on 15 January 1993. By June 1993 the deployment had built up to a full battalion of 939 soldiers. This battalion was rotated every six months until October 1994, when new deployments ceased, and the last Zimbabweans were finally withdrawn in early 1995.[24]

Four Zimbabweans lost their lives during the UNOSOM mission in Somalia.[25] These included Pte. Themba Moyo, who was killed by local militia in an altercation during August 1994.[24]

Second Congo War, 1998 to 2002

Main article: Second Congo War

Command and Organisation

Command

Commander Zimbabwe National Army:

- Lt. Gen. Philip Valerio Sibanda (1 January 2004 to present)[26]

- Lt. Gen. Constantine Guveya Chiwenga (July 1994 to 31 December 2003)[27]

- Lt. Gen. Vitalis M. 'Fox' Gava Zvinavashe (1992 to 1994)

- Gen. T. R. Solomon Mujuru (1981 to 1992)

- Lt. Gen. Alistair ‘Sandy’ C. L. Maclean (18 April 1980 to 1981)


Chief of Staff, General Staff: Maj. Gen. Trust Mugova[26]

Chief of Staff, Administration: Maj. Gen. Douglas Nyikayaramba[26]

Chief of Staff, Quartermaster Staff: Maj. Gen. Sibusiso B. Moyo[26]


Brigadier-General (Administration Staff): Brig. Gen. Shylet Moyo.[28]

Brigadier-General (Quartermaster Staff):

Brigadier-General Inspectorate: Brig. Gen. Kasirai Tazira[29]


Director Public Relations: Lt. Col. Alphios Makotore[30][31][32]

Director Civil-Military Relations: Col. Charles Matema (until his death in a car accident in February 2016).[33]

Director of Training: During 2011 this was Brig. Justin Itai Mujaji but he is more recently reported to be 5 Inf Bde commander

Director of Engineering: Col. Mkhululi Bhika Ncube.[34]

Director Corps of Signals: Col. Masenda

Director Electrical & Mechanical Engineering:

Director Medical Corps: Col. Mutetse

Director of Intelligence Corps: Col. Morgan[?] Mzilikazi

Director Zimbabwe Military Police Corps: Col. Fidelis Mhonda

Director of Transport: Col. Elliot Dzirutwe

Director Pay & Records: Col. Ezekiel Zabanyana

Director of Education: Col. Morris Masunungure. (Col. Enias Hungwe until his death on 26 June 2014.[35])

Director Social Services: Col. Zvanyadza Machinjili.

Chaplain-General: Col. Joseph Nyakudya.[36]

Formations

The Zimbabwe National Army has eight brigade-sized formations, plus two districts. These are 1 to 5 Infantry Brigades, Presidential Guard Brigade, Mechanised Brigade and Artillery Brigade, Harare District and Bulawayo District.[37]

One, now dated, web publication gave the infantry brigade organisation as:[46]

Units

Training establishments

Personnel

These are the Zimbabwe National Army ranks authorised for use today and their equivalent Commonwealth designations. The ranking order is largely based on the British system, with the Air Force of Zimbabwe maintaining separate titles inherited from the Rhodesian Air Force.[4]

Commissioned Officers

Main article: Commissioned Officers

The ZNA lost many of its best trained and experienced officers in the early 1990s, failing to recruit or instruct enough personnel to make up for the imbalance caused by death, emigration, or retirement. By the outbreak of the Second Congo War, only a handful of the officer corps had seen action. An interim measure was the rapid promotion of troops from non-combat units, often selected for their political connections rather than leadership competence.[6] Theoretically, promotions continue to be based on the pre-independence system, which dictates officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel pass a proficiency examination to qualify for advancement. In times of downscaling, those with poorer marks must retire or accept an immediate demotion.[4]

Rank structure of the Zimbabwe National Army[4]
Title General Lieutenant general Major general Brigadier Colonel Lieutenant colonel Major Captain Lieutenant Second lieutenant

Insignia

Equipment

Former ZNA Eland Mk4 armoured car at the Zimbabwe Military Museum, Gweru.

Anti-tank weapons

Light infantry weapons

Vehicles and Towed Artillery

Origin Type Acquired In service Notes
T-54/55  Soviet Union Main Battle Tank 30[78] Sourced from Libya, North Korea.[4]
Type 59  China Main Battle Tank 22[79]
Type 69/79  China Main Battle Tank 10[80]
T-34  Soviet Union Medium Tank 10[4] --
Type 63  China Armoured Personnel Carrier 30[79] 10[78]
BTR-60  Soviet Union Armoured Personnel Carrier 40[78]
BTR-152  Soviet Union Armoured Personnel Carrier 20[4] 16[78] Formerly ZIPRA.[79]
UR-416  Germany/ Rhodesia Armoured Personnel Carrier 50[81] 14[78]
EE-11 Urutu  Brazil Armoured Personnel Carrier 7[82]
MAP 75  Rhodesia Multipurpose Armoured Vehicle -- Serviceability doubtful.[80]
Crocodile  Rhodesia MRAP 40[83]
Leopard  Rhodesia MRAP -- Inherited from Rhodesian Army.[4]
Hippo  South Africa MRAP -- Inherited from Rhodesian Army.[4]
Eland Mk7  South Africa Armoured Car 28[4] 20[83]
Ferret  United Kingdom Scout Car 10[78] --
BRDM-2  Soviet Union Scout Car 10[4] 5[78]
EE-9 Cascavel  Brazil Armoured Car 90[79] 10[80] Modernised by a South African firm in 2014.[84]
Dongfeng EQ2050  China Utility Vehicle 300[85] 2004-2007
Land Rover Defender  United Kingdom Utility Vehicle -- Serviceability doubtful.[86]
Mazda B1800  Japan Light Truck Purchased 2004 - 2005.[86]
D-74 Field Gun  Soviet Union Howitzer 4[79]
BL 5.5  United Kingdom Howitzer 4[4] --
Ordnance QF 25 pounder  United Kingdom Howitzer 18[4]
BM-21 Grad  Soviet Union Multiple Rocket Launcher 6[4]
RM-70  Czechoslovakia Multiple Rocket Launcher 58[79] Purchased 1991 - 2000.[79]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 "Zimbabwe Military Strength". Retrieved 30 January 2015.
  2. 1 2 Zimbabwe National Army Archived May 18, 2014, at the Wayback Machine.
  3. "Zimbabwe's holidays". Retrieved 30 January 2015.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Nelson, Harold. Zimbabwe: A Country Study. pp. 237–317.
  5. Alasdair Dennis, "The Integration of Guerrilla Armies into Conventional Forces: Lessons Learnt from BMATT in Africa," South African Defence Review 5 (1992). Retrieved June 2012. Paper presented at a conference on Changing Dynamics: Military-Strategic Issues for a Future South Africa, hosted by the Institute for Defence Politics in conjunction with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, CSIR conference centre, Pretoria, 6 August 1992.
  6. 1 2 Security Forces
  7. Gann, Lewis. The Development of Southern Rhodesia's Military System, 1890- 1953. Occasional Papers n.s. no. 91 (Salisbury GP: 1965). National Archives of Zimbabwe. p 1-82.
  8. Sampson, Richard. With Sword and Chain in Lusaka: a Londoner's life in Zambia, 1948–1972. Trafford Publishing. pp. 107–108.
  9. Moorcraft, Paul L.; McLaughlin, Peter (April 2008) [1982]. The Rhodesian War: A Military History. Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books. ISBN 978-1-84415-694-8.
  10. "Air Force of Zimbabwe History". Retrieved 30 January 2015.
  11. 1 2 Cilliers, Jackie (December 1984). Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia. London, Sydney & Dover, New Hampshire: Croom Helm. p. 5. ISBN 978-0-7099-3412-7.
  12. W.H. Morris-Jones. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House (2013 ed.). Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. pp. 121–122. ISBN 978-0-714-63167-7.
  13. Other People's Sons: Conscription, Citizenship, and Families 1970-1980
  14. Rasmussen, R. K., & Rubert, S. C., 1990. A Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe, Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, NJ, USA.
  15. Good sources for this first period are Norma J. Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987, Cambridge, 2003, and Susan Rice, The Commonwealth Intervention in Zimbabwe 1980, D.Phil thesis, New College Oxford, 1990
  16. Kriger, 2003, p.113
  17. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on April 15, 2008. Retrieved April 14, 2008.
  18. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on February 5, 2012. Retrieved April 14, 2016.
  19. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Refworld - Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 - Angola". Refworld. Retrieved 30 January 2015.
  20. "Archived copy". Archived from the original on September 27, 2011. Retrieved August 24, 2011.
  21. http://www.zbc.co.zw/news-categories/top-stories/11017-zdf-among-the-best-forces-chiwenga.html
  22. http://allafrica.com/stories/199911050140.html
  23. 1 2 Rupiah, Martin, Lt. Col. (1995) Peacekeeping operations: The Zimbabwean experience. In: Shaw, M. & Celliers, J. (eds), South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa, Volume 1. Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, South Africa: 111-125.
  24. 'UN Peacekeeping, Fatalities by Nationality and Mission - up to 31 October 2016', accessed 18 November 2016, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf
  25. 1 2 3 4 Organisation, ZNA website, undated, accessed 13 November 2016 <http://www.zna.gov.zw/en/organisation>
  26. 'Chiwenga Appointed ZDF Commander', The Herald (Harare), 29 November 2003.
  27. 1 2 3 'President Promotes 37 ZNA Officers', The Herald (Harare), 9 March 2016.
  28. Manzongo, J., 2012, 'Remain Resolute, Army Officers Urged', The Herald (Harare), 5 March 2012.
  29. ’ZNA's Mahlanza Dies’, The Herald (Harare), 28 May 2013.
  30. Mawonde, A., 2015, ‘ZNA Names Accident Dead’, The Herald (Harare), 1 April 2015.
  31. Razemba, F., 2016, 'ZNA Denies Dzamara Claims', The Herald (Harare), 3 June 2016.
  32. 'ZNA Senior Officer Dies in Accident', The Herald (Harare), 29 February 2016.
  33. 1 2 Maponga, G., 2015, 'Second De-Mining Squadron on Cards', The Herald (Harare), 23 June 2015.
  34. Machingura, M., 2014, Director Army Education Colonel Hungwe Dies', The Herald (Harare), 30 June 2014.
  35. 1 2 Machingura, M., 2014, 'Kombi Fatally Runs Over Soldier', The Herald (Harare), 29 May 2014.
  36. 1 2 3 4 ‘Thousands Mark ZDF Anniversary’, The Herald (Harare), 10 August 2016.
  37. ‘Zimbabwe National Army - 1 Infantry Brigade: Colours Presentation Ceremony’, Zimpapers Byo ‘The Chronicle’ (Bulawayo). 1 September 2016, accessed 1 December 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odq6km5mZrA
  38. Chimutambgi, T. (2016) ‘We'll Defend Zimbabwe, Whatever it Takes—ZNA’, The Herald (Harare), 25 February 2016.
  39. Dembedza, P. (2014) ‘Brig-Gen Bandama Dies’, The Herald (Harare), 12 July 2014.
  40. Musiiwa, M. (2013) ‘Army Commander Warns Illegal Settlers’, The Herald (Harare), 11 December 2013.
  41. Manzongo, J. (2012) ‘Remain Resolute, Army Officers Urged’, The Herald (Harare), 5 March 2012.
  42. Manzongo, J. (2014) 'Appoint Soldiers As Parastatal CEOs', The Herald (Harare), 21 February 2014.
  43. Mambo, E. (2015) ‘Presidential Guard Boss in Hot Soup’, Zimbabwe Independent, 15 June 2015.
  44. ’Military Will Not Respect Puppets’, The Herald (Harare), 5 June 2012.
  45. Smith, L.J., updated by Rikhye, R. (2002) 'Zimbabwe Army, v. 1.1', 29 December 2002.
  46. Musazulwa, R., 2005, 'Arms embargo hampers Zim military training', Zimbabwe Standard (Harare), 20 March 2005
  47. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  48. Mukwati, E. (2016) 'Army Should Defend Independence', The Herald (Harare), 28 June 2016.
  49. 1 2 Moyo, O., 2015, 'Lt Colonel Tshuma Appointed Commander 1:1 Combat Group', The Chronicle (Bulawayo), 9 January 2015, accessed 30 June 2016, http://www.chronicle.co.zw/lt-colonel-tshuma-appointed-commander-11-combat-group/
  50. ‘Zimbabwe National Army - 1 Infantry Brigade: Colours Presentation Ceremony’, Zimpapers Byo '‘The Chronicle'’ (Bulawayo). 1 September 2016, accessed 1 December 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odq6km5mZrA
  51. ‘Zimbabwe National Army - 1 Infantry Brigade: Colours Presentation Ceremony’, Zimpapers Byo '‘The Chronicle'’ (Bulawayo). 1 September 2016, accessed 1 December 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odq6km5mZrA
  52. Chimutambgi, T. (2016) 'We'll Defend Zimbabwe, Whatever it Takes—ZNA', The Herald (Harare), 25 February 2016.
  53. 'Army Officer Stabs Teacher in the Chest Over Snooker Token', New Zimbabwean, 7 May 2015.
  54. Sibanda, T., 2012, 'Army Deploys Battalion to Campaign for Zanu-PF', SW Radio Africa (London), 18 July 2012
  55. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  56. ’Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) Face Starvation in Barracks As Food Supply Runs Out,’ New Zimbabwe Vision, 5 February 2016, <http://newzimbabwevision.com/tag/2-combat-group/> accessed 13 November 2016
  57. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  58. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  59. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. ‘’Southern African Report’’, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  60. 'Put Country First, Army Chief Tells Soldiers', The Herald (Harare), 1 October 2012.
  61. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  62. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  63. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  64. Profile: Zimbabwe Security Forces. Southern African Report, July 2011, Institute for Security Studies, Mopani Media.
  65. 'Arms Theft—Soldier Jailed 35 Years', The Herald (Harare), 1 February 2010.
  66. Murwira, Z. (2011) 'Defence Forces lauded for technical expertise', The Herald (Harare), 2 August 2011.
  67. Mateko, M. (2005) 'ZNA Clearing Landmines', The Herald (Harare), 9 May 2005.
  68. '212 Graduate From ZNA', The Herald (Harare), 10 December 2007.
  69. 1 2 3 Training, ZNA website, undated, accessed 13 November 2016, <http://www.zna.gov.zw/en/training>
  70. 'Sappers Finish Course', The Herald (Harare), 22 June 2013.
  71. 'Be Vigilant, ZNA Commandos Urged', The Herald (Harare), 3 October 2009.
  72. '243 Army Recruits Graduate', The Herald (Harare), 22 October 2010.
  73. Pito, N. 2011, 'What Makes a ZNA Soldier Tick?', The Herald (Harare), 1 December 2011.
  74. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Jones, Richard D. (January 27, 2009). Jane's Infantry Weapons 2009/2010 (35th ed.). Jane's Information Group. ISBN 978-0-7106-2869-5.
  75. Gangarosa, 2001. pp. 76–77.
  76. Headquarters 1 Brigade/Brady Barracks (Gate Exhibit), Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe National Army, 2010
  77. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Simon Baynham. Zimbabwe in transition (October 1992 ed.). Almqvist & Wiksell International. p. 240. ISBN 978-9122015086.
  78. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 "Trade Registers". Armstrade.sipri.org. Retrieved 2013-06-20.
  79. 1 2 3 "Zimbabwe army crippled: Report exposes decay". Nehanda Radio. Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 30 January 2015.
  80. Kevin Douglas Stringer. Military Organizations for Homeland Defense and Smaller-scale Contingencies (2006 ed.). Praeger Security International. p. 99. ISBN 978-0275993085.
  81. Wheeled Armored Fighting Vehicles
  82. 1 2 "Scramble for the Congo - Anatomy of an Ugly War" (PDF). ICG Africa. 2000-12-20. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-10-29. Retrieved 2013-06-18.
  83. Boomslang Logistics
  84. "Mengshi EQ2050" (in English and French). Maquetland. Archived from the original on January 18, 2013.
  85. 1 2 "Arms ban hits security forces". The Zimbabwe Independent. Retrieved 30 January 2015.

Further reading

This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 12/1/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.