The Weird State of the State


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Session 1 slide deck for Refactor Camp 2016, "Weird Political Economy"

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The Weird State of the State

  1. 1. The Weird State of the State A DEEP DIVE into Fukuyama’s Career Bookend Masterpieces… 1. The End of History and the Last Man (1989/1992) 2. The Origins of Political Order (2011) 3. Political Order and Political Decay (2014) With CAMEO appearances of ideas from Mass Flourishing, Dictator’s Handbook, How Nations Fail…
  2. 2. Francis Fukuyama Who is he? (hint: not John Galt) • Political scientist (GMU, JHU, Stanford) • Political philosophy at Cornell under Allan Bloom • …who was student of Alexander Kojeve, interpreter of Hegel • Member of Telluride, along with Paul Wolfowitz • Toyed with French ideas (Derrida), didn’t like ‘em • Student of Samuel Huntington • Who wrote Political Order in Changing Societies • …and Clash of Civilizations • …Fareed Zakaria was also a student (The Future of Freedom, The Post-American World, editor of Foreign Policy, CNN guy) • Worked at RAND for a bit • Wrote essay in National Interest, End of History (1989) • Made it a book, End of History and the Last Man, 1992 • Associated with neocon coterie in Bush Sr. admin • Wrote some other good stuff that nobody will remember • Broke from the neocons ~2004 • Wrote 2-volume magnum opus • The Origins of Political Order (2011) • Political Order and Political Decay (2014) tl;dr: a product of the American academic- political complex, with distinguished lineage and a hand in history- shaping
  3. 3. Francis Fukuyama Who is he really? • A Japanese guy (this mattered differently in 1989 than in 2012-14) • An intellectually honest guy in politics • In the right place (political science) at the right time (1989)… • …with the right BIG IDEA (End of History) that was interesting, whether or not it was/is right or wrong • …and framed conversations for a critical decade • …when people were hungry for relief from post-Cold- War/Internet era anomie • … and has spent the last decade working out all the details of his theories in careful, exhausting level of detail tl;dr: an intellectually honest and high-integrity guy in a field not known for either of those traits, who wielded influence at a critical time, learned a lot, dared to change his mind with new facts, and cared enough to write it all down
  4. 4. Francis Fukuyama No, who is he really? 
 • An institutional democrat with strong statist tendencies • Probably the one guy who knows the most about what democracy means as both an abstract political concept and as a living, practiced global idea, warts and all • Somebody whose intellectual faith in democracy has been harshly tested and has come out stronger • …but left him with a bit of yearning for a bit of benevolent authoritarianism of a Confucian-Scandinavian fusion • A guy with something of a blind-spot when it comes to corporatist economies • …and a tendency to overstate the strengths of the continental European model of democracy while understating those of the Anglo-Saxon model • A guy who appreciates the significance of markets more than many institutionalists, but… • …underestimates them anyway tl;dr: somebody worth taking really seriously in forming your opinions of politics, history, globalization, societal change…
  5. 5. The End of History 1. History evolves to an asymptote 1. A double-take on Hegel via Kojeve) 2. …but this is not the naive historicism that Popper critiques 3. Clever bit is identifying “democracy” as the end-state 4. …which makes ALL the difference 5. WHY? Shift from Carsean finite to infinite “end” games 1. Other ends = somebody (‘“good guys”) wins (finite) 2. Democracy as end = “we all continue playing” (infinite) 2. That asymptote is defined by universal spread of democracy 1. Notion of “democratic peace” (that democracies rarely go to war with each other) is consistent 3. Does not mean events or evolution stop, anymore than victory of DNA over other replicator molecules “stopped” evolution 4. And characterized by “Last Man” psychology 1. Derived from Nietzsche “men without backs” idea 2. Doesn’t get as much attention but very interesting
  6. 6. Impact 1. Neocons co-opted it with a mix of bad faith and misunderstanding 1. …as convenient code for “America wins Cold War = Our Destiny” 2. …as basic navigation aid to post-USSR chaos 3. …as justification (to the “winner” of the “end” the spoils) 2. His former teacher (Huntington) and his later student (Zakaria) didn’t like it…but couldn’t really counterpunch in Fukuyama’s weight class 3. Derrida didn’t like it, but his criticisms were more whiny than substantive 4. Regular Marxists whined about it, meh 5. Idiots said “haha you’re wrong” by misunderstanding both the events of post-89, and the book’s thesis 6. tl;dr: Fukuyama was right, but it does not mean what you think it means 7. Think of it as “slouching towards democracy, and leveling up to games beyond”
  7. 7. Montage of Relevant Stuff: 1989 - 2016 1. Fall of Berlin Wall, Tiananmen Square (1989) 2. THE INTERNET HAPPENED 3. Iraq War 1 4. Chechnya, Kosovo, Rwandan genocide… 5. Liberalization of India (1991), Death of Deng Xiaoping,(1997) 6. 9/11 —> Afghan War —> Iraq War 2 —> ‘War on Terror’ 7. MOAR INTERNETZ! and subprime crisis too 8. BRICs: Putin’s Russia 2.0, post-Deng China, post-Nehru-Gandhi India, Brazil (??) 9. Failed nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan 10. LOTS MOAR INTERNETZ! AND MOBILEZ! 11. Decline of Al Qaeda and rise of ISIS. Arab Spring 12. Rise of Far Right and Far Left in Europe and a debt crisis 13. #Occupy, Tea Party, Anonymous, Wikileaks 14. SERIOUSLY RIDICULOUS AMOUNTS OF INTERNETZ 15. Syria, Ukraine, Obama deciding NOT invade Syria, Russia 16. NOW, REALLY EMBARRASSING AMOUNTS OF INTERNETZ 17. AND IoT AND DRONES. EVEN FUKUYAMA GOT A DRONE 18. Trump and Bernie and Scottish independence vote and Brexit 19. Faltering of ISIS, Syrian refugee crisis, Europe terror rise, Turkey failed coup
  8. 8. HAHA THE END OF HISTORY IS CONTINUING TO HAPPEN AND A LOT OF PEOPLE DON’T LIKE IT Crony Capitalists, Reactionaries, Frustrated Marxists, Deep State establishment wusses, tribalists, legalists, terrorists, thought police, identity regulators, cops who like to shoot black people, Trump, Singapore Fanboys, Racists, Boohoo Yay Liberal Democracy Yay Internetz Yay (Liberal Democracy+Interenetz)?
  9. 9. Big Point The “End of History” is a real signal The inexorable rise of the Internet is the ONLY OTHER signal that matters in the last 30 years Everything else is noise, no matter how bloody, sad, stupid or urgent-seeming So BIG question is…. Does this signal harmonize or interfere with the End of History?
  10. 10. Big Descriptive Thesis across both volumes There are THREE factors of liberal democracy 1. A strong state* 1. First emerged in China, 300 BC, improved under Ottomans etc. 2. Emerged in modern form in Germany, ~1700 AD 2. Rule of Law 1. Originally religious law (India, Egypt? Sumer?) 2. Then in slowly secularizing form in Europe, post 1100 AD 3. Accountability (coups don’t count) 1. Ancient Greece had whig origin myth version of the idea 2. Real deal: Magna Carta onwards from feudal parliament roots 3. Slow expansion of franchise and mechanisms 4. Okay, maybe there are 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th factors: 1. Modern Markets, post-1800 (Edmund Phelps, Raghuram Rajan speech) 2. Individualism as a construct, post-1100 (my own hypothesis) 3. Innovation infrastructure (most philosophical technologists) 4. International order: Foreign policy, multinational institutions like EU 5. “Deviant Globalization”: The book, the talk: https://
  11. 11. Null hypothesis from Dictator’s Handbook •It’s mostly just window dressing, and democracies and absolutist polities are just points in the same space •Democrats just rely on larger group to survive, but otherwise respond to the same incentives in exactly the same ways •This is mostly consistent with Fukuyama actually, DH is “behaviorist”, and FF is “cognitive-behaviorist” model •The BIG difference is that in Fukuyama model, the “middle class” is better understood through long-term institutional volition and universalist political goals rather than narrow goals and responses to incentives •For middle class, the rest of society free riding on the fruits of its political actions is an acceptable cost
  12. 12. Devil-in-the-Details Supporting Descriptive Theses 1. The sequence matters 2. There are a few ways to get it right 1. Germany (invented the modern state) 2. The UK (invented modern accountability) 3. The US (invented modern clientelism and vetocracy) 4. Japan (getting to rule of law via rule by law) 5. India (mired in clientelism, like US in 1850s-1900) 6. China (trying to marry democracy and pre-Mao statism) 3. There are FAR more ways to get it wrong 4. When you get it wrong, you get institutional collapse BUT 5. This is NOT the same as civilizational collapse 6. This is NOT the same as the End-of-History process unwinding
  13. 13. Big Normative Thesis across both volumes You need to develop mechanisms that create a DYNAMIC BALANCE among the three pieces Strong State Rule of Law Accountability
  14. 14. …though he clearly favors something more like this Strong State Rule of Law Accountability “More equal than others” in balance
  15. 15. Page 41, Political Order and Political Decay, data from World Bank Strength is about effectiveness, not size
  16. 16. Page 40, Political Order and Political Decay, data from World Bank Lack of effectiveness gets you corruption*
  17. 17. “Getting to Denmark” 1. There is no right answer, but UK-style parliamentary democracy over US-style vetocracy 2. …with a stiff dose of Northern European style social democrat mechanisms (but not EU-level US-style institutions) 3. …and a dose of benevolent corporatism, 4. …and a slight advantage for Confucians over Legalists 5. Gets you to “to Denmark” 6. The Notional Denmark that is… 1. …and here he backslides slightly from a great infinite game end-of-history argument 2. …to a specific, historicist, Popper-would-hate-it, PASTORAL end-of-history 7. BUT these are not reasons to throw it out, they are weaknesses in model to mitigate
  18. 18. This brings us to…
  19. 19. Evolution of Theorizing 1. Pre-Axial Age (until 800 BC): “Pristine” state formation, not much evidence of theorizing 2. Axial-Age (800 BC to 800 AD) Monarchist theories of competitive statecraft, not cleanly separated from military and religious theories. Sun Tzu (China), Kautilya (India), Plato (Greece) thinkers 3. Medieval Horizontalism (800 AD - 1600): Fragmented world, limited grand theorizing: Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), Machiavelli’s Prince (1513) 4. 1647: Treaty of Westphalia, “birth” of modern state 5. 1647-1800: Early-modern political theorizing, largely in a Eurocentric vacuum of data: Hobbes, Rousseau. 6. Modern: 1800-1950: 1. Political science: Various bad-faith theories of dubious intellectual merit, built around the assumptions of Mercantilism, Marxism, Libertarianism, Capitalism etc. 2. Political economy: Starting to get serious, get beyond Mercantilism 3. Sociology: Good foundations of sociology: Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Max Weber (1864-1920), Marx (1818-1883), Nietzsche (1844-1900) 7. Cold War (1950-1990): Reign of “Modernization Theory” in US-USSR competitive context. Theory subservient to political doctrine and “party ideologue” thinking. Asia, Africa and Latin America as “test set” for theories developed in the Europe- America “sample set.” Result: resounding failure. 8. 1968: Huntington publishes Political Order in Changing Societies
  20. 20. 50 years ago: 1966-74 as a Breakpoint Comparable to 1647 (treaty of Westphalia) 1. 1966: Botswana founded and begins rise as ‘African counterexample’ 2. 1968: Fifth Institutional Act (full dictatorship) in Brazil 3. 1968: Japan becomes 2nd largest economy 4. 1969: Internet is turned on, RIP Industrial Age 5. 1969: Apollo 11, Peak Industrial Age technology model 6. 1969-71: Cultural Revolution in China 7. 1971-75: Rise of Indira Gandhi, independence of Bangladesh 8. 1971: Bretton-Woods agreement ends, RIP Gold Standard 9. 1971: Idi Amin rises in Uganda 10. 1973: First oil shock, from $3 to $12 a barrel 11. 1974: Peak Centralization, Nixon impeachment, RIP Industrial social order 12. 1974: Venkat is born, almost nobody notices Other things from that era: War on Drugs (1971), Vietnam protests, SALT I in Helsinki (1970)… Basically, between 1966 and 1974 it became clear that… 1. The post-WW-II world order was on its way down. 2. There were modern playbooks other than the Euro-American playbook 3. A generation of leaders shaped by WW II and anti-colonialism died 4. The technology model peaked and birthed its own disruptor 5. “Westernization” theory in the guise of modernization theory had failed 6. A new game was starting and a positioning scramble was ON
  21. 21. Assumptions of Post-Modern Political Theorizing 1. The Western historical experience is not universal 2. Without institutions, ideologies are irrelevant 3. There are non-Whig and non-Western playbooks 4. Democratic transitions may involve authoritarianism 5. In the short-medium term, history matters more than theory 6. Technology is the prime driver of sociopolitical change… 7. …but constrains rather than determines sociopolitical order
  22. 22. Part 1: Before the State Part 2: State Building Part 3: The Rule of Law Part 4: Accountable Government Part 5: Towards a Theory of Political Development
  23. 23. Part 1: Before the State Big idea: Replace Hobbes/Rousseau/Marx/Whig/Game- Theoretic theorizing with empirical tribalism models 1. Biology matters: kinship and reciprocal altruism 2. mechanical vs. organic solidarity 3. band —> unilinear tribes —> cognatic tribes —> patron-client tribes 4. property rights: usufactory versus ownership 5. Big Man law, blood feud laws, scaling for warfare 6. Tribalism to patronage 7. Pristine versus competitive state formation Examples to remember: Papua New Guinea wantoks as little commons vetocracies, pastoral nomads and access rights, early clientelism example in Rome
  24. 24. There are, however, rules about how blood feuds are to be pursued. The kinsman of a slain Nuer man may go after the perpetrator, and also any of the perpetrator’s close male kin, but has no right to touch the mother’s brother, father’s sister, or mother’s sister, since they are not members of the slayer’s lineage…Parties to a dispute go through elaborate rituals to prevent escalation, such as sending the spear that injured a man to the victim’s village, so that it can be magically treated to prevent the wound from becoming fatal… …But as tribal societies themselves evolved, the strict genealogical basis of the segmentary lineage gave way to cognatic tribes, and tribes that accepted members that could make no claim of actual kinship. If we define tribe more broadly to include …patrons and clients linked through reciprocity and personal ties, then tribalism remains one of the great constants of political development… …In Rome, for example, the agnatic descent groups…were known as gentes. But already by the time of the early Republic the gentes began to accumulate large numbers of nonkin followers known as clientes. These consisted of freedmen, tenants, household retainers, and in later periods poor plebeians willing to offer their support in return for cash or other favors… Tribalism
  25. 25. Tribal Societies versus Sovereign States 1. Tribal societies versus states 1. First, they possess a centralized source of authority 2. Second, that source of authority is backed by a monopoly of the legitimate means of coercion 3. Third, the authority of the state is territorial rather than kin based 4. Fourth, states are far more stratified and unequal than tribal societies 5. Finally, states are legitimated by much more elaborate forms of religious belief 2. Theories of pristine state formation: as voluntary social contract, as hydraulic engineering project (Egypt), as response to population density, as product of violence and compulsion, as product of charismatic authority 3. Why transition to states is not universal in all pristine tribal conditions: geography 4. “It is not clear how important it is to develop such a theory, however, since the vast majority of states around the world were the products of competitive rather than pristine state formation.”
  26. 26. Part 2: Pristine State Building Big idea: There are multiple ways to exit tribalism, which create different flavors of initial condition bias, reflecting history and geography 1. Feudalism as beginnings of territorial states 2. War as key force: 10% mobilization in early China 3. Impersonal state vs family: Eunuchs, Priesthood 4. Ideas matter: Confucianism vs. Legalism 5. Geography: role of cities, large plains 6. Institutions can grow despite cyclic promotion/resistance Three examples: Early China, Early India, Islamic world
  27. 27. “Shang Yang began his career as a minister in the state of Wei before moving to what was then the relatively backward state of Qin and becoming the chief adviser to its leader, Duke Xiao. Upon his arrival, he struggled with the existing patrimonial administration. He attacked their inherited privileges and eventually succeeded in replacing hereditary office with a system of twenty ranks that were to be awarded on the basis of merit—meaning, in the case of this frontier state, military merit. Land, retainers, women slaves, and clothing were all to be allocated by the state on the basis of performance…. “Confucianism is an intensely backward-looking doctrine that roots legitimacy in ancient practices…Family and kinship were at the core of that patrimonial order, and Confucianism can in many ways be seen as an ideology that builds a broad moral doctrine of the state outward from a model based on the family…. “Mao, like Shang Yang before him, saw traditional Confucian morality and the Chinese family as obstacles to social progress. His anti-Confucian campaign sought to delegitimize familistic morality; party, state, and commune were the new structures that would henceforth bind Chinese citizens to one another.” China — prototypical early state
  28. 28. “The essence of the rule of law is a body of rules reflecting the community’s sense of justice that is higher than the wishes of the person who happens to be the king. This was the case in India…The jati system arises out of the concept of karma…The only possibilities for for social mobility existed… between lifetimes “…under the Mauryan empire…[t]he core state of Magadha does not appear to have had any modern features whatsoever…there was no feudalism in the Chinese or European sense… “…there was never the social basis for the development of a tyrannical state that could concentrate power so effectively that it could aspire to reach deeply into society and change its fundamental social institutions. “Individual freedom in India has been limited much more by things like kinship ties, caste rules, religious obligations, and customary practices. But in some sense, it was the tyranny of cousins that allowed Indians to resist the tyranny of tyrants.” India — prototypical early rule of law
  29. 29. 6. The world is a garden, its walls are the state. 2. There can be no military without wealth. 3. The reaya produce the wealth. 1. There can be no royal authority without the military. 4. The sultan keeps the reaya by making justice reign. 5. Justice requires harmony in the world. 7. The state’s prop is the religious law. 8. There is no support for the religious law without royal authority. Ottoman “Circle of Equity” Middle East — beginnings of synthesis, accountability
  30. 30. The Importance of Eunuchs — short-circuiting kinship as a driver “Socrates points out [in the Republic] that sexual desire and the desire for children are natural, but that ties to the family compete with loyalty to the city that the guardians protect. It is for that reason, he argues, that they must be told the “noble lie” that they are children of the earth, and not of biological parents. “Eunuchs played a critical role in the functioning of the system as well. Unlike eunuchs in China or the Byzantine Empire, Muslim eunuchs were almost all foreigners who were born outside of Muslim lands…They shared with the Mamluks the situation of being cut off from their families and hence were devotedly loyal to their masters. But their sexual condition allowed them to play an important function as educators of young Mamluks. “Machiavelli captures the essence of the Ottoman state: it was far more centralized and impersonally managed than France in the early sixteenth century, and in that way more modern…Like the manor lord in Europe, the timar holder provided local government functions like security and the dispensing of justice.
  31. 31. Part 3: Rule of Law Big idea: Rule of Law versus Rule by Law 1. Rule of Law constrains emperor, 2. Rule by Law simply codifies imperial intentions 3. Rule of Law usually starts with religion 4. Evolution: Tribal law to customary to common 5. Common law versus Constructivism 6. Hayek idea: Law before legislation 7. Transition from status to contracts 8. Property rights evolved due to Church war against family Examples to remember: Ancient India, Catholic Church, Islamic Clergy, modern American supreme court
  32. 32. “The monk Gratian, trained in the legal curriculum, analyzed thousands of canons issued over the past centuries; he reconciled and synthesized them into a single body of canon law. This was published in 1140 in a massive legal treatise of some fourteen hundred pages, the Concordance of Discordant Canons, or the Decretum. Gratian established a hierarchy among divine, natural, positive, and customary law, and established rational procedures by which contradictions among them could be resolved. “Where both India and the Middle East differed from Europe was in the fact that their religious establishments did not extract themselves from the political order. There was never anything like a Brahmin pope, and while there was a Muslim caliph, after the Umayyads he was largely a captive of the dominant political ruler in the Islamic lands. “Rule of law existed in medieval Europe, the Middle East, and India well before any of these regions made a transition to modernity. Rulers in all of these societies acknowledged that they lived under a law that they themselves did not create. And yet, the degree to which this would impose real restrictions on their behavior depended not just on this theoretical acknowledgment but also on the institutional conditions surrounding the formulation and enforcement of law.”
  33. 33. “The Common Law is called common because it is not particularistic. That is, the myriad customary rules that governed the different regions of England were replaced by a single Common Law, in which a precedent in one part of the realm was applicable to the rest of the kingdom (the principle of stare decisis).”
  34. 34. “Constructivism, Hayek argued, was a conceit of the last three hundred years, and particularly of a series of French thinkers including Descartes and Voltaire, who thought the human mind was sufficient to understand the workings of human society. This led to what Hayek regarded as huge mistakes, such as the French and Bolshevik revolutions, in which top-down political power was used to reorder the whole of society based on a preconceived notion of social justice.”
  35. 35. “This body of secular law became known as the kanunname (derived from the term “canon law” used in Europe), and was used in areas where traditional Islamic jurisprudence failed to establish adequate rules” [Interesting factoid: In hindi, the law is more often referred to as ‘kanun’ (the Urdu word) than ‘nyaya’ (the Sanskrit word) — V]
  36. 36. Part 4: Accountability Big idea: Formal accountability is procedural: the government agrees to submit itself to certain mechanisms that limit its power to do as it pleases. 1. Whig history is determinate and historicist 2. Fukuyama version is indeterminate and evolutionary 3. Survival is a matter of balance-environment-fit (BEF) 4. Shift to a monetary economy is the major force 5. Rise of the ideal of equality in terms of dignity 6. Existence of powerful cities as “internal exit” 7. Shift from status to contract
  37. 37. “The miracle of modern liberal democracy, in which strong states capable of enforcing law are nonetheless checked by law and by legislatures, could arise only as a result of the fact that there was a rough balance of power among the different political actors within the society. If none of them was dominant, then they would need to compromise. What we understand as modern constitutional government arose as a result of this unwanted and unplanned compromise. “In what has become known as “Whig history,” the growth of liberty, prosperity, and representative government is seen as an inexorable progress of human institutions that begins with Greek democracy and Roman law, is enshrined early on in the Magna Carta, then threatened by the early Stuarts, but defended and vindicated during the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution…The problem with Whig history is not that it is necessarily wrong in its fundamental conclusions. In fact, its emphasis on the role of taxation as the primary driver of accountability is broadly correct. The problem is rather that, like all single-country histories, it cannot explain why parliamentary institutions emerged in England but not in other similarly situated European countries….”
  38. 38. [Variational] Framework for State Building 1. “Weak absolutism. The French and Spanish monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries epitomized the new absolutist state, and they were more centralized and dictatorial in certain ways than, say, their Dutch and English counterparts.” 3. “Successful absolutism. The Russian monarchy succeeded in co-opting both its nobility and gentry, and turning them into a service nobility completely dependent on the state.” 5. “Failed oligarchy. The aristocracies of both Hungary and Poland succeeded early on in imposing constitutional limits to the power of the king, who then remained weak and unable to construct a modern state.” 7. “Accountable government. Finally, England and Denmark were able to develop both strong rule of law and accountable government, while at the same time building strong centralized states capable of national mobilization and defense.” 8. Alternatives. “The Dutch Republic and the Swiss confederation represented alternative republican pathways to accountable government and rule of law, while the Prussian monarchy developed a strong modern state and rule of law in the absence of accountability.”
  39. 39. Upper Nobility Gentry Third Estate The State Peasantry Pre-Modern Agrarian Genome Note: not the same as the traditional “estates” of clergy, nobility, commoners. There were too many variations in the definitions. Fukuyama uses a loosely consistent definition across the cases. Feudal lords Clergy, Minor nobility City dwellers, “bourgeoisie”, free farmers The ruler, plus state machinery Serfs, non- politically activated farmers
  40. 40. Upper Nobility Gentry Third Estate The State Peasantry Weak Absolutism Genome: France “If absolutism didn’t succeed fully in France, neither did the social groups opposing it succeed in forcing on the state some form of political accountability. Indeed, their failure was by far the greater of the two and was a result of their failure to act cohesively”
  41. 41. Upper Nobility Gentry Third Estate The State Peasantry Successful Absolutism Genome: Russia “Peter replaced the old mestnichestvo with a Table of Ranks in 1722, a hierarchical system in which each of his subjects was entered into a legally defined order with its own privileges and obligations. By reaching a certain grade, a nonnoble servitor, whether bureaucrat or military man, was automatically entered into the ranks of the hereditary nobility.”
  42. 42. Upper Nobility Gentry Third Estate The State Peasantry Failed Oligarchy Genome: Hungary “In Hungary, the absolutist project initially failed because a strong and well- organized noble class succeeded in imposing constitutional limits on the king’s authority. The Hungarian Diet, like its English counterpart, made the Hungarian king accountable to itself. Accountability was not sought on behalf of the whole realm but rather on behalf of a narrow oligarchic class that wanted to use its freedom to squeeze its own peasants harder and to avoid onerous taxes to the central state…”
  43. 43. Upper Nobility Gentry Third Estate The State Peasantry Accountable Government Genome: England “But increasingly real power was held by a royal official, the shire reeve (or sheriff), who was appointed by the king and represented royal authority. The shire reeve organized a shire moot or council, which all free men (later all free landowners) in the district were obliged to attend on the occasion of its biannual meetings.The Norman Conquest did not destroy this system of governance but only renamed it, so that the shires became counties following continental Frankish practice. However, the power of the king’s representative, the sheriff, increased greatly at the expense of the hereditary ealdorman.” “A political system that is all checks and balances is potentially no more successful than one with no checks, because governments periodically need strong and decisive action.”
  44. 44. Part 5: Towards a Theory of Political Development Big idea: We are now ready to build an empirically grounded, evolutionary theory of political development that can address questions related to post-1800 techological modernity 1. Whig history is determinate and historicist 2. Fukuyama version is indeterminate and evolutionary 3. Survival is a matter of balance-environment-fit (BEF) 4. Shift to a monetary economy is the major force 5. Rise of the ideal of equality in terms of dignity 6. Existence of powerful cities as “internal exit” 7. Shift from status to contract
  45. 45. The State of Nature origin myth — Fukuyama edition • “Human beings never existed in a presocial state. [SO ROUSSEAU WAS RIGHT] • “Natural human sociability is built around two principles, kin selection and reciprocal altruism. [TRIBALISM IS NATURAL] • “Human beings have an innate propensity for creating and following norms or rules. [BUT SO IS THE TENDENCY TO CREATE IMPERSONAL ANTI-TRIBAL INSTITUTIONS] • “The human instinct to follow rules is often based in the emotions rather than in reason, however. Emotions like guilt, shame, pride, anger, embarrassment, and admiration are not learned behaviors in the Lockean sense of being somehow acquired after birth through interaction with the empirical world outside the individual. Rather, they come naturally to small children, who then organize their behavior around genetically grounded yet culturally transmitted rules. [IT’S ABOUT EMOTIONAL UX/NARRATIVE, NOT JUST UTILITARIAN FUNCTION…] • “Human beings have a natural propensity for violence. Human beings by nature desire not just material resources but also recognition. [BUT HOBBES WAS RIGHT TOO]
  46. 46. Differences between political and biological evolution • “First, in political evolution, the units of selection are rules and their embodiments as institutions, rather than genes as in biological evolution. • “Second, in human societies, variation among institutions can be planned and deliberate, as opposed to random. • “The third way political development differs from biological evolution is that the selected characteristics—institutions in one case, genes in the other—are transmitted culturally rather than genetically. • “The conservation of institutions has a clear adaptive value: if people did not have a biological proclivity to conform to rules and patterns of behavior, the rules would have to be constantly renegotiated at enormous cost to the stability of the society in question. On the other hand, the fact that societies are so enormously conservative with regard to institutions means that when the original conditions leading to the creation or adoption of an institution change, the institution fails to adjust quickly to meet the new circumstances.”
  47. 47. Contemporary Evolution • “The key is the possibility of sustained intensive economic growth. Growth in per capita output does far more than put larger resources in the hands of states. It stimulates a broad transformation of society and mobilizes a host of new social forces that over time seek to become political actors as well….” • “…Social mobilization is one important key to breaking out of the dysfunctional equilibria represented by traditional elites locked in rent-seeking coalitions…” • “The other hugely important difference between political development then and now is the degree to which international factors affect the evolution of national institutions. Almost all of the stories told in this book [Vol 1] involve single societies and the interplay among different domestic political actors within them. International influences appear largely as a result of war, conquest or the threat of conquest, and the occasional spreading of religious doctrines across borders….” [all in Vol 2] • …The situation in this regard is very different today. The phenomenon we now label globalization is only the latest iteration of a process that has been taking place continuously over the past several centuries with the spread of technologies related to transportation, communications, and information…There were “transnational” institutions at this time like the Catholic church and the Islamic caliphate, which were important in facilitating the diffusion of institutions including the Justinian Code or sharia across political boundaries.”
  48. 48. “[W]e can pose two questions about future political development that are not answerable at this juncture.” 1. “Can China continue to grow economically and maintain political stability without either rule of law or accountability?” 2. What is the future of liberal democracy given that “The failings of modern democracies come in many flavors, but the dominant one in the early twenty-first century is probably state weakness: contemporary democracies become too easily gridlocked and rigid, and thus unable to make difficult decisions to ensure their long-term economic and political survival.”? V’s additional questions: 1. Is there a further balance to be achieved between market and state? 2. Is there further secular drift away from biology to post-family individualism? 3. Will there be more complexity in the international order? 4. Will the Dictator’s Handbook change?
  49. 49. Part 0: Introduction/Modern Context Part 1: The State Part 2: Foreign Institutions Part 3: Democracy Part 4: Political Decay
  50. 50. On the Subprime Crisis “But the legislation ignored simpler remedies, such as sharply raising bank capital requirements or putting hard caps on the size of financial institutions, in favor of a highly complex stew of new regulations. Three years after passage of the legislation, many of those detailed rules had not yet been written and would likely not solve the underlying too-big-to-fail problem even if they were.” On the Arab Spring “Indeed, the spread of political Islam can be seen as a form of identity politics very comparable to its nationalist variant in Europe. This was an argument first made by Ernest Gellner [who] argued that nationalism is a response to the identity dislocation that occurs as societies modernize and transition from Gesellschaft—the small village—to Gemeinschaft—the large city.” On “Nation Building” in Afghanistan traditional tribal relationships based on patronage and clientelism began to break down and were replaced by far more predatory forms of prebendalism in which individual governors or ministers simply appropriated vast sums of money without returning much in the way of services.
  51. 51. Getting from such a patrimonial state to “Denmark”—that is, an impersonal state that treats citizens equally, protects their rights, and observes a clear line between public and private interest—is a much more difficult transition for most societies than moving from authoritarian government to democracy. Larry Diamond has argued that we are in the midst of a “democratic recession,” with setbacks in Turkey, South Africa, Thailand, something like a stock market correction, in which the longer-term trend toward spreading liberal democracy has been momentarily interrupted, or whether it represents a more fundamental turning away. The problem of decay has to do with the political system. Decay is not the same thing as civilizational decline;
  52. 52. Part 1: The State Big idea: A modern state is an artificially stabilized impersonal entity designed to operate effectively while withstanding corrupting forces, and emerges one institution at a time 1. Neopatrimonialism 2. Meritocratic Reform 3. Moral hazard instability 4. Vetocracy and Capture
  53. 53. Stage 1: Repatromialized Start: [The Old] Forest Bureau, and the Department of Agriculture of which it was a branch, had been part of the clientelistic party-based nineteenth-century political system, whose main purpose was to deliver political benefits to members of Congress. Stage 2: Competence Gap: “but lack the necessary skills to do their jobs; their numbers could be insufficient to deliver adequate services; or they can lack necessary fiscal resources. Stage 3: Meritocratic Reform: What Pinchot did was to operate not bureaucratically but politically, building an informal network of allies both inside and outside government… …The fact that Gifford Pinchot as an agent was not under the strict control of his congressional principals suggests that the principal-agent framework by which contemporary economists understand the problems of organizational dysfunction is perhaps not adequate to really understand how good bureaucracies work Stage 4: Golden Age: Gifford Pinchot’s original USFS was regarded as the gold standard of American bureaucracies he won a high degree of autonomy for an organization of well-trained professionals dedicated to a centeral mission, the sustainable exploitation of American forests. The Forest Service Example: Political Order Rising
  54. 54. “In fact, the political patronage relationship, whether involving family or friends, is one of the most basic forms of human social organization in existence. It is universal because it is natural to human beings. The big historical mystery that has to be solved is thus not why patronage exists but rather why in modern political systems it came to be outlawed and replaced by impersonal organization.” “Hence patrimonialism has evolved into what is called “neopatrimonialism,” in which political leaders adopt the outward forms of modern states—with bureaucracies.” “What has never happened in German history is the wholesale distribution of government offices to party workers as a matter of political patronage, as occurred in the United States, Italy, and Greece.” “While modern political orders seek to promote impersonal rule, elites in most societies tend to fall back on networks of family and friends, both as an instrument for protecting their positions…When they succeed, elites are said to ‘capture’ the state.” Neopatrimonialism
  55. 55. The bureaucratic tradition established in eighteenth-century Prussia survived Jena and Napoleon, transition to the German Empire, Weimar democracy and the Nazi regime, and then the return to democracy under the postwar Federal Republic. Britain began the nineteenth century with an unreformed and patronage- ridden civil service. It cleaned up its bureaucracy beginning in the middle decades of the century, however, laying the foundations for a modern civil service that remains in place to this day. The United States similarly developed a party-led patronage system beginning in the 1820s, in which political appointees dominated the government at federal, state, and local levels. Those countries that created strong bureaucracies while they were still authoritarian, like Prussia, created enduring autonomous institutions that survived subsequent changes of regime into the present. On the other hand, countries that democratized before a strong state was in place, such as the United States, Greece, and Italy, created clientelistic systems that then had to be reformed. Meritocratic Reform of Civil Services
  56. 56. Building technocratic capacity in government is not just a matter of sending bureaucrats to a few weekend executive training sessions. It requires huge investments in higher educational systems. The Stein-Hardenberg reforms in Prussia could not have had the positive effect they did without the simultaneous creation of new universities by reformers like Wilhelm von Humboldt, who established the new University of Berlin, while the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms in Britain were accompanied by Benjamin Jowett’s shake-up of Oxford and Cambridge. One of the most impressive accomplishments of the Meiji oligarchs in the late nineteenth century was their creation of a network of modern universities in Japan, whose graduates went on to staff the new bureaucracies in Tokyo.
  57. 57. It is impossible to run a large organization, public or private, without a bureaucracy, but once authority has been delegated to the administrative hierarchy, the chief executive loses a great deal of control and often becomes a prisoner of that very bureaucracy. (This was the central premise of the BBC comedy series Yes, Minister, where the permanent secretary, In a well-functioning political system, the agent should have enough autonomy to do its job well, but should also remain ultimately accountable to the principal. On the other hand, bureaucracies can have too much autonomy. I described what were perhaps the two most notorious cases of this in modern history, the German and Japanese military bureaucracies prior to the first and second world wars. In both cases a strong tradition of autonomy led to high-quality military organizations, but it also led to their usurping of the goal-setting authority of the political leaders that were nominally their principals. Moral Hazard Instability
  58. 58. Vetocracy and Capture “American political institutions are unique, if only because they are so antique…George Washington in his Farewell Address warned against “the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party; a conflict that would divide and potentially destroy the new nation…The only Founding Father who showed an interest in strong and capable government was Alexander Hamilton, who laid out the case for “energy in the executive” These regions were the least economically developed in Britain, and it was indeed their high levels of poverty that drove hundreds of thousands of Scotch- Irish to emigrate. The Scotch-Irish were poor but intensely proud both in Britain and in the United States. [Jacksonian Core] The spontaneous emergence of these machines in response to an expanding base of relatively poor voters again suggests that clientelism is an efficient way of energizing this type of population and therefore should be seen as an early form of democratic participation. Municipal-level political machines were simply modernized and highly organized versions of the Melanesian Big Man and tribal wantok
  59. 59. Part 2: Foreign Institutions Big idea: Importing political institutions can fail in more ways than it can succeed 1. Extractive elitism: South America 2. Displacement without replacement: Africa 3. Cautious, selective import: Japan 4. China: Return to pre-Communist patterns
  60. 60. Argentina thus was saddled with two bad historical legacies: a powerful landed oligarchy and a tradition of personalistic authoritarian leadership. But authoritarian institutions in Latin America were overdetermined. The political orders created in Peru and Mexico were settler colonies that succeeded in eradicating virtually any institutional trace of the dense pre- Columbian state structures that preceded them. As settlement colonies, they tended to replicate the class-based, mercantilist society found back on the Iberian peninsula, in which indigenous laborers and mestizos took the place of the white European peasantry. In the second half of the eighteenth century, Latin America as a whole didn’t look that different from Europe in political terms…Yet in the succeeding two centuries, Europe underwent a profound series of political changes that left it much more democratic and economically equal than Latin America. One of the principal reasons for this was the extraordinarily high level of violence experienced by Europe during this period, Only in the 2000s does a more European type of political order appear to be emerging in Chile and Brazil. Latin America
  61. 61. But African ethnic groups are largely a modern phenomenon, created either in the colonial period or consolidated in postcolonial times. A classic segmentary lineage—a tribe, speaking anthropologically—is a group that traces common ancestry to a progenitor who may be two, three, or more generations distant. Modern ethnic groups, by contrast, encompass hundreds of thousands if not millions of people. The contemporary African sense of ethnic identity was, as we will see in the following chapter, often cultivated by the colonial authorities… It is said that the British Empire was created in a fit of absentmindedness; this was in fact true not just of that empire but also of those of many other Europeans. Africa — sociology is modern, not traditional
  62. 62. “Even though Africa encompasses a wide variety of political regimes from stable democracies to authoritarian kleptocracies to failed states, there are certain generalizations that can be made about many of them. There is an African mode of governance that characterizes many states” “The deadly legacy of European colonialism was not an “extractive” authoritarian state but rather the profound absence of strong institutions altogether.” “Power-crazy psychopaths are particularly numerous in the colonies—far more so, proportionately, than in France. They belong to a large class of unbalanced individuals who seek out colonial life; their psychic make-up is particularly attracted by the exotic.” “The practice of hacking off hands and arms as warnings in Sierra Leone that so outraged Western opinion was originally practiced by the Force Publique in Leopold’s Belgian Congo” Africa — it IS kinda a country
  63. 63. “The colonial powers experienced what today is labeled “mission creep,” which has been the bane of American post–cold war foreign policy: a small intervention, designed to be of limited purpose and duration, creates on-the- ground interests and commitments that then require further interventions to make the whole effort sustainable.” “The fact that the African colonies could barely be made to pay for the costs of their own administration led the Europeans to seek a cheap way out through “indirect rule,” “The problem with outside promotion of indigenous rights, however, is that it is very difficult for outsiders to accurately judge the real interests of local communities, just as it was for the practitioners of indirect rule. Many of these communities are already half modernized, just as many Africans were in the early twentieth century, and many would actually have jumped at the chance to join the modern world.” Africa — indirect rule doctrine and mission creep
  64. 64. “Given this tradition, then, it was probably inevitable that after studying English Common Law, Japan passed it up in favor of a civil law system based on those of France and Germany. The English version, with its sprawling decentralized system of judge-made law, was less suited to Japanese traditions than the more compact civil system that could be grafted onto existing Japanese bureaucratic traditions.” “They were following a syllogism that said, “All modern states have constitutions; Japan aspires to be a modern state; therefore Japan must have a constitution.” East Asia: Japan Chooses What to Import
  65. 65. Two Japanese scholars, Okada Asataro and Matsuoka Yoshitada, established the first modern law school in Beijing in 1906. [Deng Xiaoping’s] political reform process that unfolded subsequently centered around the slow construction of a series of rules that would limit the ability of any future charismatic leader to emerge and wreak havoc on the whole of Chinese society in the manner of Mao. The reformers faced principled opposition from ideologues within the party who were opposed to ownership of property… They squared this circle by creating a set of usufructuary (usage) rights that could be bought, sold, mortgaged, or transferred, in which the state nonetheless retained formal ownership. I would argue that the state that has emerged in China since the beginning of reforms in 1978 bears more resemblance to this classical Chinese state than it does to the Maoist state that preceded it, or even to the Soviet state that the Chinese tried to copy. They no longer study Confucian classics but a combination of Marxist-Leninist tracts, engineering textbooks, and Western management literature. East Asia: China Tries to Invent a New Way
  66. 66. One of the fundamental tenets of Western public administration is that public- sector agencies are not allowed to retain earnings and thus have no incentive to control costs or perform more efficiently. This explains why there is a big effort to push money out the door whenever an agency ends the fiscal year with a surplus. The Chinese party-state upended this verity by in effect permitting local governments to keep surplus revenues and use them for their own purposes. Localities were put under a hard budget constraint, given the authority to extract certain types of taxes, and allowed to start profit-making businesses to supplement their tax revenues. In a sense, the Chinese independently discovered the principles of what in the West has gone under the label of New Public Management, an approach that sought to extend marketlike incentives to the public sector. East Asia: China Tries to Invent a New Way
  67. 67. Part 3: Democracy Big idea: Understand it as a specific historical story 1800-2000, not as an abstraction 1. Three-wave spread model 2. The religion angle 3. Economics angle 4. The middle class 5. Marx’s mistake 6. Importance of Institutions Five examples:
  68. 68. Three-Wave Spread Model “Between 1970 and 2010, the number of democracies around the world increased from about 35 to nearly 120, or some 60 percent of the world’s countries, in what Samuel Huntington called the Third Wave of democratization.” •First (long) wave 1820s to 1900
 •Second (short) wave happened in the immediate aftermath of World War II. •The Third Wave began with the democratic transitions in Spain and Portugal in the early 1970s and continued through the end of military rule in Greece and Turkey, followed by a series of Latin American countries… then it moved to Asia…and culminated in the collapse of communism and the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe
  69. 69. Religion Hypothesis Both Hegel and Nietzsche understood modern political democracy to be a secularized version of the Christian doctrine of the universal equality of human dignity. Tocqueville does not explain why the idea of human equality became progressively more powerful, except to suggest that it was an act of God. This has led to the assertion, made by parties as diverse as Samuel Huntington, the contemporary Chinese government, and a variety of Islamists, that liberal democracy does not represent a universal trend but is something culturally specific to Western civilization.
  70. 70. Economics Angle • “But what is the connection between economic development and democracy? Do people’s values somehow magically flip over to favor democracy when they achieve a certain level of well-being?” • “Adam Smith asserted that the division of labor is limited by the size of the market, or, put differently, that as markets expanded through increased trade in a commercial and later an industrial economy, a new division of labor would arise and deepen.” • “This division of labor entailed the creation of new social groups…it follows logically that these new groups, excluded from participation in the political institutions of the old agrarian society, would demand a share of political power”
  71. 71. The Middle Class “The key insight [of the Marxist analytical framework as modified by Barrington Moore] is that democracy is desired most strongly by one specific social group in society: the middle class. •“The middle classes, defined in occupational and educational terms rather than by level of income… tended to support the liberal part of liberal democracy. That is, they wanted legal rules that protected their rights…
 •“The working classes—Marx’s famous industrial proletariat—were conversely more interested in the democratic part of liberal democracy, •“Large landowners, and particularly those making use of repressive labor (slavery, serfdom, or other nonmarket conditions of labor), have almost everywhere been authoritarian opponents of democracy.
 •“The peasantry had complicated and sometimes inconsistent political aspirations.” If you’re in this symposium this is you
  72. 72. Marx’s Mistake • “Marx’s framework can be summarized as follows. Out of the old feudal order, the first new social class to be mobilized is the bourgeoisie, townsmen who were regarded contemptuously by the old landowners but who accumulated capital and used new technologies to bring about the Industrial Revolution. • “For example, the bourgeoisie is far from being a unified group. It includes large industrialists like the Thyssens and Rockefellers as well as small shopkeepers and urban professionals…
 • “For example, the bourgeoisie is far from being a unified group. It includes large industrialists like the Thyssens and Rockefellers as well as small shopkeepers and urban professionals…”
 • “…one of the weaknesses of Marx’s analytical framework is his use of “class” as a key determining variable. Marx sometimes talks as if social classes—the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, feudalists—were clearly defined political actors
 • A central problem with any simple class-based analysis of democratization is that there were a number of cross-cutting issues that united people across class lines and blurred the class profiles of political parties.”
  73. 73. Argument for Institutionalism •“In reality, social classes are intellectual abstractions, useful analytically, but incapable of producing political action unless they are embodied in specific organizations. •“A stable democratic system will emerge only if these newly mobilized groups are successfully incorporated into the system and allowed to participate politically. Conversely, instability and disorder will occur if those groups do not have institutionalized channels of participation. •“[W]hile individual leaders of such [Peasant] revolts might aspire to join the oligarchy, it never occurred to them to displace the class-bound system as such. •“Accountability was the result of what seems in retrospect to be the almost accidental survival of a feudal institution, the medieval estate or parliament, into the modern era.
  74. 74. Political parties, however, were in most places illegal. In the more repressive territories, activists had to organize secret societies, like the Young Italy of Giuseppe Mazzini. It was these middle-class groups, legal and illegal, that would spearhead the Revolutions of 1848 The creation of merit-based bureaucracies, ultimately accountable to the public but protected in many ways from the vagaries of democratic politics, is one expression of the concerns raised in these now-forgotten arguments against the spread of democracy. Part of the story of the Third Wave of democratizations in Europe and Latin America has to do with the reinterpretation of Catholic doctrine after Vatican II in the 1960s to make it compatible with modern democracy. [RETCON FORCES?]
  75. 75. “1848 appears as the one revolution in the modern history of Europe which combines the greatest promise, the widest scope, and the most immediate initial success, with the most unqualified and rapid failure.” The “Springtime of Peoples,” to which the Arab Spring has been compared “That is, the Middle East experienced the same kind of shift from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, from traditional villages to modern cities, that Europe experienced in the late nineteenth century, with all of the anomie and identity confusion that such a shift entails. “Indeed, the spread of political Islam can be seen as a form of identity politics very comparable to its nationalist variant in Europe. This was an argument first made by Ernest Gellner…Gellner, it will be recalled, argued that nationalism is a response to the identity dislocation that occurs as societies modernize and transition from Gesellschaft—the small village—to Gemeinschaft—the large city.”
  76. 76. Part 4: Political Decay Big idea: Vetocracy as most important modern failure mode… other elements, neopatrimonialism, moral hazard etc. familiar from other eras/chapters…
  77. 77. Stage 5: Crisis: Great Idaho Fire of 1910, which burned some three million acres in Idaho and Montana, and led to the death of eighty-five people. The political outcry…led the USFS to increasingly focus on wildfire suppression… Stage 6: Authoritarian High Modernism: The problem with fighting wildfires is that the early proponents of “scientific forestry” didn’t properly understand the role of fires in woodland ecology. Forest fires are a natural occurrence and play an important function in maintaining the health of western forests. the forests were invaded by species like Douglas firs once fires were suppressed. (Lodgepole pines in fact require fires to propagate their seeds.) Stage 7: Moral Hazard and Interest Group Capture: Moreover, as a result of population growth in the West, more people were living in areas close to forests and therefore vulnerable to wildfires. By one estimate, the wildland-urban interface expanded more than 52 percent from 1970 to 2000 and would continue to expand well into the future…Like people choosing to live on floodplains and on barrier islands, these individuals were exposing themselves to undue risks that were mitigated by government-subsidized insurance. Stage 8: Vetocratic Gridlock: None of the old missions were discarded, however, and each one tended to link up to different external interest groups…consumers of timber, environmentalists, homeowners, western developers, young people seeking temporary jobs as firefighters….Many of the travails of the Forest Service described earlier can be attributed to the ways its judgments could be second-guessed through the court system. The Forest Service Example: Political Decay
  78. 78. “The very stability of institutions is also the source of political decay. Institutions are created to meet the demands of specific circumstances. However, the original environment in which institutions are created is subject to change.” “In the absence of strong institutional incentives, the groups with access to a political system will use their positions to favor friends and family, and thereby erode the impersonality of the state.”
  79. 79. United States Britain Dictatorship Number of Veto Players/Checks and Balances DifficultyofDecision-Making Modified Buchanan-Tullock Curve
  80. 80. Political scientist George Tsebelis coined the term “veto players” as a means of comparing diverse political systems. All institutional rules that delegate powers to different political actors within the system constitute potential veto points where individual veto players can block action by the whole body. A veto player is simply political science lingo for what Americans have traditionally called checks and balances. a linear scale going from an absolute dictatorship, in which there is only one veto player (the dictator), to a consensus system in which every citizen wields a potential veto over action by the whole. There is intense populist distrust of elite institutions and demand either to abolish them Ironically, however, Americans when polled show the highest degree of approval precisely for those institutions—the military, NASA, the CDC—that are the least subject to immediate democratic oversight. Vetocracy
  81. 81. “Americans have pretended to cap the size of the state by delegating the actual work of government to legions of contractors, subcontractors, and quasi-public bodies, some for profit, and many nonprofit, especially in the area of social services. “This outsourcing of sovereignty has been celebrated by many people for different reasons. On the right, many think that private contractors can do the work of government more efficiently than public agencies. On the left, there are those who think that nongovernmental organizations providing public services are more participatory and subject to a kind of direct democratic control.” Vetocracy
  82. 82. Afterword Comment “Advocates of a “network society” dream of a world in which all decisions are made on a voluntary, peer-to- peer basis without the need for hierarchy or enforcement. But as anyone who has sat through a meeting of a large committee that cannot come to consensus knows, or as victims of crime understand, the real world often doesn’t operate that way. “While the American economy remains a source of miraculous innovation, American government is hardly a source of inspiration”