Soviet offensive plans controversy

The Soviet offensive plans controversy refers to the debate among historians on the question of whether Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was planning to attack Axis forces in Eastern Europe prior to Operation Barbarossa.

While most agree that Stalin made extensive preparations for an eventual war and exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage, the assertions that Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941, and that Barbarossa was a preemptive strike by Hitler, are generally discounted according to David M. Glantz.[1]


Immediately after the Axis invasion of the USSR during World War II, Adolf Hitler asserted that the Soviet Red Army had made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, thus justifying the German invasion as a preemptive strike.[2] After the Second World War, this view was supported by some Wehrmacht leaders, like Wilhelm Keitel.[3]

Suvorov, Icebreaker, and the 1980s

In the 1980s Vladimir Rezun, a former officer of the Soviet military intelligence and a defector to the UK, reiterated and explored this claim in his 1987 book Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War,[4] (written using the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov) and in several subsequent books. He argued that Soviet ground-forces were extremely well organized, and were mobilizing en masse all along the German-Soviet border for a Soviet invasion of Europe slated for Sunday, July 6, 1941, but they were totally unprepared for defensive operations on their own territory.

One of Suvorov's pieces of evidence favoring the theory of an impending Soviet attack was his claim regarding the maps and phrasebooks issued to Soviet troops. Military topographic maps, unlike other military supplies, are strictly local and cannot be used elsewhere than in the intended operational area. Suvorov claims Soviet units were issued with maps of Germany and German-occupied territory, and phrasebooks including questions about SA offices — SA offices were found only in German territory proper. In contrast, maps of Soviet territory were scarce. Notably, after the German attack, the officer responsible for maps, Lieutenant General M.K. Kudryavtsev, was not punished by Stalin, who was known for extreme punishments after failures to obey his orders. According to Suvorov, this demonstrates that Kudryavtsev was obeying the orders of Stalin, who simply did not expect a German attack.[5]

Suvorov offers as another piece of evidence the extensive effort Stalin took to conceal general mobilization by manipulating the laws setting the conscription age. That allowed Stalin to provide the expansive build-up of the Red Army. Since there was no universal military draft in the Soviet Union until 1939, by enacting the universal military draft on 1 September 1939, and by changing the minimum age for joining the Red Army from 21 to 18, Stalin triggered a mechanism which achieved a dramatic increase in the military strength of the Red Army.

This specific law on mobilization allowed the Red Army to increase its army of 1,871,600 men in 1939 to 5,081,000 in the spring of 1941 under secrecy to avoid alarming the rest of the world.[6] Eighteen million reservists were also drafted. The duration of service was 2 years. Thus, according to supporters of the Soviet Union Offensive Plans Theory, the Red Army had to enter a war by 1 September 1941 or the drafted soldiers would have to be released from service.


Suvorov's main points include the following:

Reactions and critiques

While most agree that Stalin made extensive preparations for an eventual war and that he exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage, the assertions that Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941, and that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike by Hitler, are generally discounted.[1]

In some countries, particularly in Russia, Germany, and Israel, Suvorov's thesis has jumped the bonds of academic discourse and captured the imagination of the public.[2] Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz,[9] and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev, Lev Bezymensky, and perhaps his most vehement Russian critic, Alexei Isayev,[10] the author of Anti-Suvorov. Many other western scholars, such as Teddy J. Uldricks,[2] Derek Watson,[11] Hugh Ragsdale,[12] Roger Reese,[13] Stephen Blank,[14] Robin Edmonds,[15] agree that the major part of Suvorov's writings rest on circumstantial evidence,[16] or even on "virtually no evidentiary base".[2][17] According to Jonathan Haslam, Suvorov's claim that "Germany frustrated Stalin's war"[18] "would be comical were it not taken so seriously".[19] Soviet-emigre historian Alexandr Nekrich (extremely critical of Stalin in other contexts) also rejected Suvorov's ideas as unsubstantiated and contrary to Stalin's broader policy.[20] Some of Suvorov's claims have been shown to simply be inaccurate, such as his claim regarding Soviet conscription only starting in 1939, when in fact, conscription existed in the RKKA since 1925 [21]

Studies by some historians, such as Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov (Stalin's Missed Chance), nevertheless gave partial support to the claim that Soviet forces were concentrating to attack Germany. Other historians who support this thesis are Vladimir Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Valeri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann[22] and Mark Solonin.[23] Offensive interpretations of Stalin's prewar planning are also supported by Sovietologist Robert C. Tucker and Pavel N. Bobylev.[24] Hoffmann argues that the actual Soviet troop concentrations were near the German-Soviet border in the former Poland, as were fuel depots and airfields. All of this is claimed to be unsuitable for defensive operations.[25]

Strength of the opposing forces on the
Soviet Western border. June 22, 1941
Germany Soviet Union Ratio
Divisions 128 174 1 : 1.4
Personnel 3,459 3,289 1.1 : 1
Guns and mortars 35,928 59,787 1 : 1.7
Tanks (incl assault guns) 3,769 15,687 1 : 4.2
Aircraft 3,425 10, 743 1 : 3.1

Source: Mikhail Meltyukhov Stalin's Missed Chance table 43,45,46,47,[26]

Supporters of the 'Soviet offensive plans' theory also refer to various facts, such as the publication of Georgy Zhukov's proposal of May 15, 1941,[27] which called for a Soviet strike against Germany, to support their position. This document suggested secret mobilization and deployment of Red Army troops next to the western border, under the cover of training.[28] However, Robin Edmonds argued that the Red Army's planning staff would not have been doing its job well if it had not considered the possibility of a pre-emptive strike against the Wehrmacht,[15] whereas Teddy J. Uldricks pointed out that there is no documentary evidence that Zhukov's proposal was ever accepted by Stalin.[2] Another piece of evidence is Stalin's speech of 5 May 1941, when he spoke to graduating military cadets.[29] He proclaimed: "A good defense signifies the need to attack. Attack is the best form of defense.... We must now conduct a peaceful, defensive policy with attack. Yes, defense with attack. We must now re-teach our army and commanders. Educate them in the spirit of attack".[30] However, according to Michael Jabara Carley, this speech could be equally interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage the Germans from launching an invasion.[31]

Other Russian historians, Iu. Gor'kov, A.S. Orlov, Iu. A. Polyakov, and Dmitri Volkogonov, analyzed newly available evidence to demonstrate that Soviet forces were certainly not ready for the attack.[2]

Colonel Dr. Pavel N. Bobylev[32]) was one of the military historians from the Soviet (later Russian) Ministry of Defense who in 1993 published the materials of the January 1941 games-on-maps. More than 60 top Soviet officers for about ten days in January rehearsed the possible scenarios of the beginning of the war with Germany and its allies. These materials show that no battles were played out on the Soviet soil. The action started only when the Soviets ("Easterners") attacked westward from their border, and in the second game("South variant")- even from the positions deep inside the enemy's land.


Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz,[33] and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev, Lev Bezymensky, and Dmitri Volkogonov. Many other western scholars, such as Teddy J. Uldricks,[34] Derek Watson,[35] Hugh Ragsdale,[36] Roger Reese,[37] Stephen Blank,[38] and Robin Edmonds,[39] agree that the Suvorov's major weakness is "that the author does not reveal his sources" (Ingmar Oldberg[40]). Historian Cynthia A. Roberts is even more categorical, claiming that Suvorov's writings are based on "virtually no evidentiary base".[41]

Suvorov's most controversial thesis is that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, but it was totally unprepared for defensive operations on its own territory.[2] Thereby Suvorov essentially reiterates the argument put forward by Adolf Hitler in 1941.[2] According to Jonathan Haslam, Suvorov's claim that "Germany frustrated Stalin's war"[18] "would be comical were it not taken so seriously".[42]

Suvorov reluctantly revealed his sources,[17] and that much of his thesis is based on circumstantial evidence.[43] Thus, one of Suvorov arguments is that certain types of weapons were mostly suited for offensive warfare and that the Red Army had large numbers of such weapons. For example, he pointed out that the Soviet Union was outfitting large numbers of paratroopers — preparing to field entire parachute armies, in fact — and states that paratroopers are only suitable for offensive action, which the Soviet military doctrine of the time recognized. Suvorov's critics say that paratroopers were used in defensive actions and that Soviet paratroopers were poorly trained and armed.[44] In like fashion, Suvorov cites the development of the KT/Antonov A-40 "flying tank" as evidence of Stalin's aggressive plans, while his critics say that development of this tank was started only in December 1941.[45]

David M. Glantz disputes the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. According to Glantz, the Red Army was only in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941, from which neither effective defensive or offensive actions could be offered without considerable delay.[46]

Antony Beevor writes that "the Red Army was simply not in a state to launch a major offensive in the summer of 1941, and in any case Hitler's decision to invade had been made considerably earlier."[47] However, he also notes that "it cannot be excluded that Stalin... may have been considering a preventive attack in the winter of 1941 or more probably in 1942..."[47]

Paweł Wieczorkiewicz, the author of a detailed description of the purge in the Red Army (Łańcuch śmierci: czystka w Armii Czerwonej 1937-1939, 1335 pages) believed that the Red Army wasn't prepared to fight in 1941 (because of the purge and modernization projects).[48]

Middle positions

In a 1987 article in the Historische Zeitschrift journal, the German historian Klaus Hildebrand argued that both Hitler and Stalin separately were planning to attack each other in 1941.[49] In Hildebrand’s opinion, the news of Red Army concentrations near the border led to Hitler engaging in a Flucht nach vorn ("flight forward"-i.e. responding to a danger by charging on rather than retreating).[49] Hildebrand wrote "Independently, the National Socialist program of conquest met the equally far-reaching war-aims program which Stalin had drawn up in 1940 at the latest".[49]


While Western researchers (two exceptions being Albert L. Weeks[50] and R. C. Raack[51][52][53]) criticised Suvorov's thesis,[54] he has gathered some support among Russian historians, starting in the 1990s. Support in Russia for Suvorov's claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge as some archive materials were declassified. Authors supporting the Stalin 1941 assault thesis are Valeri Danilov,[55] V.A. Nevezhin,[56] Constantine Pleshakov, Mark Solonin[23] and Boris Sokolov.[57] Although the USSR attacked Finland, no documents have been found to date which would indicate 26 November 1939 as the assumed date for the beginning of provocations or 30 November as the date of the planned Soviet assault.[58]

One view was expressed by Mikhail Meltyukhov in his study Stalin's Missed Chance.[59] The author states that the idea for striking Germany arose long before May 1941, and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941. Providing additional support for this thesis is that no significant defense plans have been found.[60] In his argument, Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan ("Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies" (Russian original)), the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War II. The last version was to be completed by May 1, 1941.[61] Even the deployment of troops was chosen in the South, which would have been more beneficial in case of a Soviet assault.[62]

Mark Solonin notes that several variants of a war plan against Germany had existed at least since August 1940. He argues that in the Russian archives there are five versions of the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army and ten documents reflecting the development of plans for operational deployment of western military districts. The differences between them were slight, all documents (including operational maps signed by the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Red Army) are the plans for the invasion with depth offensive 300 km. Solonin also states that no other plans for Red Army deployment in 1941 have been found so far,[63] and that the concentration of Red Army units in Western parts of USSR was done in direct accordance with the May "Considerations on plan for strategic deployment":

Planned and actual Red Army deployment on the Soviet Western Border

"Considerations", May 41 "Reference", June 13 Actual confinement as of June 22, 1941
Northern Front Three armies, 21 / 4 / 2 ------ 22 / 4 / 2 14th, 7th, 23rd Armies, 21 / 4 / 2
North-Western Front Three armies, 23 / 4 / 2 ------ 23 / 4 / 2 27th, 8th, 11th Armies, 25 / 4 / 2
Western Front Four armies, 45 / 8 / 4 ------ 44 / 12 / 6 3rd, 10th, 4th, 13th Armies, 44 / 12 / 6
South-Western Front and Southern Front Eight armies,122 / 28 / 15 ------ 100 / 20 / 10 5th, 6th, 26th, 12th, 18th, 9th Armies,

80 / 20 / 10

Stavka reserve five armies, 47 / 12 / 8 five armies, 51/ 11 / 5 22nd, 20th, 21st, 19th, 16th, 24th, 28th Armies, 77 / 5 / 2

Notes: - first digit – total number of divisions, second digit – tank divisions, third – motorized divisions

- on June 21, armies expanded in the Southern Theatre of Military Operations, and were divided into two Fronts: South-Western and Southern. The table contains the total number of divisions in the two Fronts and in the Crimea.

- according to the Plan of Cover, after the commencement of combat actions, two divisions of the Northwest front, expanded in Estonia, were transferred to the Northern Front, but the table doesn't indicate this.

Source: Mark Solonin (2010) (in Polish). 23 czerwca Dzień M (1 ed.). Poznań, Poland: Dom Wydawniczy Rebis. pp. 204. ISBN 978-83-7510-257-4. The table is available online on Mark Solonin's website

In Stalin's War of Extermination, Joachim Hoffmann made extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. The book is also based on open-source, unclassified literature, and recently declassified materials. Based on this material, Hoffmann argues that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own attack when the Wehrmacht struck. He also remarked that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 had long been known and analyzed. Danilov and Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents in the early 1990s, which might indicate Soviet preparations for an attack, in the Austrian military journal (Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers came to the conclusion that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army.

In 2006, a collection of articles (entitled The Truth of Viktor Suvorov) by various historians who share some views with Suvorov was published.[64] This was followed by a number of sequels, six as of September 2010. In a 2009 essay entitled "Don’t Blame Hitler Alone For World War II", journalist Eric Margolis endorsed Suvorov's assertion that Operation Barbarossa was a "preventive war" forced on Nazi Germany by an alleged impending Soviet attack, and that it is wrong to give Hitler "total blame" for World War II.[65]

In another sequel to the collection, entitled the New Truth of Viktor Suvorov, Uri Milstein also defended Suvorov's positions.

Several politicians have also made claims similar to Suvorov's. On August 20, 2004, historian and former Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar published an article in The Wall Street Journal titled When Will Russia Say 'Sorry'?. In this article, he said: "The new evidence shows that by encouraging Hitler to start World War II, Stalin hoped to simultaneously ignite a world-wide revolution and conquer all of Europe". Another former statesman to share his views of a purported Soviet aggressive plan is Mauno Koivisto, who wrote: "It seems to be clear the Soviet Union was not ready for defense in the summer of 1941, but it was rather preparing for an assault.... The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive, but for offensive aims." Koivisto concludes: "Hitler's invasion forces didn't outnumber [the Soviets], but were rather outnumbered themselves. The Soviets were unable to organize defenses. The troops were provided with maps that covered territories outside the Soviet Union."[66]

See also


  1. 1 2 Glantz, David M., Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of War, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998, ISBN 0-7006-0879-6 p. 4.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Teddy J. Uldricks. The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler? Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 626-643
  3. André Mineau. Operation Barbarossa: ideology and ethics against human dignity Rodopi, 2004. ISBN 978-90-420-1633-0
  4. Viktor Suvorov, Thomas B. Beattie. Icebreaker: who started the Second World War? Hamish Hamilton, 1990. ISBN 0-241-12622-3, ISBN 978-0-241-12622-6
  5. Suvorov, Viktor. The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.
  6. V. Suvorov, The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War 2 Naval Institute Press (2008)
  7. Pravda, February 14, 1938, cited from V. Suvorov Last Republic (Последняя республика), ACT, 1997, ISBN 5-12-000367-2, pages 75–76
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 Richard Pipes Communism: A History (2001) ISBN 0-8129-6864-6, pages 74–75.
  9. David M. Glantz (Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 263-264
  10. See Alexei Isayev at Russian Language Wikipedia (Russian)
  11. Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer, 2000), pp. 492)
  12. Hugh Ragsdale, Reviewed work(s): Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia by Gabriel Gorodetsky, Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Summer, 2000), pp. 466-467
  13. Slavic Review, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), p. 227
  14. Russian Review, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 310-311
  15. 1 2 Reviewed work(s): Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? by Viktor Suvorov ; Thomas B. Beattle. Source: International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4, Seventieth Anniversary Issue (Oct., 1990), p. 812
  16. Chris Bellamy. Absolute war. Soviet Russia in the Second World War. Vinage, 2007. ISBN 978-0-375-72471-8. p.103.
  17. 1 2 Cynthia A. Roberts. "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941" Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 8 (Dec., 1995), pp. 1293-1326
  18. 1 2 V. Suvorov, Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? (London, 1990) p. 325
  19. Jonathan Haslam. Reviewed work(s): Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War. by R. Raack The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Second World War: Russo-German Relations and the Road to War, 1933-1941. by G. Roberts. The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 785-797
  20. Aleksandr Moiseevich Nekrich, Adam Bruno Ulam, Gregory L. Freeze. Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941. Columbia University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-231-10676-9, ISBN 978-0-231-10676-4, p. 233
  21. Roger R. Reese, Stalin's Reluctant Soldiers, University Press of Kansas, 1996. pp.9-15. ISBN 0-7006-0772-2.
  22. Bellamy 2007, p. 115.
  23. 1 2 Mark Solonin. June 22 (The Cask and the Hoops)
  24. Weeks 2003, p. 103.
  25. (Maser 1994: 376–378; Hoffmann 1999: 52–56)
  26. Meltyukhov 2000, (electronic version). Note that, due to the fact that Soviet archives were (and in some cases still are) inaccessible, in some cases exact figures have been difficult to ascertain.
    The official Soviet sources generally overestimated German strength and downplayed Soviet strength, as emphasized by David Glantz (1998:292). Some of the earlier Soviet figures claimed that there had been only 1,540 Soviet aircraft to face Germany's 4,950; that there were merely 1,800 Red Army AFVs facing 2,800 German ones, etc.
    In 1991, Russian military historian Meltyukhov published an article on this question (Мельтюхов М.И. 22 июня 1941 г.: цифры свидетельствуют // История СССР. 1991. № 3) with figures that differed slightly from those of the table here, though with similar ratios. Glantz (1998:293) was of the opinion that those figures "appear[ed] to be most accurate regarding Soviet forces and those of Germany's allies", though other figures also occur in modern publications.
  27. Russian original
  28. Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives, Anchor, (1997) ISBN 0-385-47954-9, pages 454-459
  29. Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography,Macmillan, 2004 ISBN 978-0-330-41913-0, Chapter: The Devils Sup', Volkogonov Papers, reel no.8, p.1.
  30. N. Lyashchenko, 'O vystuplenii I. V. Stalina v Kremle, 5 maya 1941', Volkogonov Papers, reel no.8, p.1.
  31. Michael Jabara Carley. Review: Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936-1941: A Review Article. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 56, No. 7 (Nov., 2004), pp. 1081-1093
  32. Бобылев П.Н. Репетиция катастрофы//Военно-исторический журнал. 1993. № 7. С. 14—21; № 8. С,28—35; Русский архив: Великая Отечественная. Т.12(1). М..1993. С,388—390; Бобылев П.Н. К какой войне готовился Генеральный штаб РККА в 1941 году//Отечественная история. 1995. № 5. С.3—20
  33. David M. Glantz; Suvorov, Viktor (1991). "Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?". The Journal of Military History. 55 (2): 263–264. doi:10.2307/1985920.
  34. Teddy J. Uldricks (1999). "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?". Slavic Review. 58 (3): 626–643. doi:10.2307/2697571. JSTOR 2697571. (Book Reviews).
  35. Slavic Review. 59 (2): 492. 2000. Missing or empty |title= (help)
  36. Hugh Ragsdale; Gorodetsky, Gabriel (2000). "Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia". Slavic Review. 59 (2): 466–467. doi:10.2307/2697094.
  37. "Book Reviews". Slavic Review. 59 (1): 227. 2000.
  38. "Book Reviews". Russian Review. 59 (2): 310–311. 2000.
  39. Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), Vol. 66, No. 4, Seventieth Anniversary Issue (Oct. 1990), p. 812
  40. Ingmar Oldberg (1985). "Review: The USSR. Evil, Strong, and Dangerous? Reviewed work(s):The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine by Andrew Cockburn, Inside the Soviet Army by Viktor Suvorov". Journal of Peace Research. 22 (3): 273–277. doi:10.1177/002234338502200308. JSTOR 423626.
  41. Cynthia A. Roberts (1995). "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941". Europe-Asia Studies. 47 (8): 1293–1326. doi:10.1080/09668139508412322. JSTOR 153299.
  42. Jonathan Haslam (1997). "Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out". The Journal of Modern History. 69 (4): 785–797. doi:10.1086/245594.
  43. Chris Bellamy. Absolute War. Vintage Books, 2008, ISBN 978-0-375-72471-8, p. 101-104.
  44. Алексей Исаев. Вертикальный охват // Неправда Виктора Суворова. М.: Яуза, Эксмо, 2007, pp. 257–289
  45. Василий Чобиток. Кое-что о волшебных танках // Неправда Виктора Суворова. (Something about magic tanks / lie of Victor Suvorov) Мoscow: Яуза, Эксмо, 2007, pp. 136–137 (in Russian)
  46. Stumbling Colossus:The Red Army on the Eve of World War, D.Glantz, preface p. xii-xiii
  47. 1 2 Beevor 2012, p. 188.
  48. 1 2 3 Evans, Richard In Hitler's shadow: West German historians and the attempt to escape from the Nazi past, New York, NY: Pantheon, 1989 p. 43 ISBN 0-394-57686-1
  49. Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941 ISBN 0-7425-2191-5
  50. Raack, R.C. (1996). "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II". World Affairs. 158 (4). JSTOR 20672468.
  51. Raack, R.C. (1996). "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: The International Debate Goes On". World Affairs. 159 (2). JSTOR 20672480.
  52. Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War ISBN 978-0-8047-2415-9
  53. (e.g., according to Raack, arguments in favor of the thesis "have not so far been systematically reported in, for example, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Indeed, one searches in vain in North America for a broad discussion of the issues of Soviet war planning" R. C. Raack [Review of] Unternehmen Barbarossa: Deutsche und Sowjetische Angriffsplane 1940/41 by Walter Post Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und das politische System der SBZ by Stefan Creuzberger Slavic Review. Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring, 1998), pp. 213
  54. Данилов.В.Д. Сталинская стратегия начала войны: планы и реальность—Другая война. 1939–1945 гг; or Danilоv V. "Hat der Generalsstab der Roten Armee einen Praventiveschlag gegen Deutschland vorbereitet?" Österreichische Militarische Zeitschrift. 1993. №1. S. 41–51
  55. Невежин В.А. Синдром наступательной войны. Советская пропаганда в преддверии "священных боев", 1939–1941 гг. М., 1997; Речь Сталина 5 мая 1941 года и апология наступательной войны Archived index at the Wayback Machine.
  56. Соколов Б.В. Неизвестный Жуков: портрет без ретуши в зеркале эпохи. (online text); Соколов Б.В. Правда о Великой Отечественной войне (Сборник статей). — СПб.: Алетейя, 1999 (online text)
  57. Собирался ли Сталин напасть на Гитлера?. Retrieved on 2011-04-26.
  58. Meltyukhov
  59. Meltyukhov 2000:375
  60. Meltyukhov 2000:370–372
  61. Meltyukhov 2000:381
  62. Comrade Stalin's Three Plans -Mark Solonin's article on his personal website
  63. Хмельницкий, Дмитрий (сост.). Правда Виктора Суворова. Переписывая историю Второй Мировой. Москва: Яуза, 2006 (ISBN 5-87849-214-8) Some of the articles appear here :
  64. Margolis, Eric (September 7, 2000). "Don't Blame Hitler Alone For World War II". Retrieved 2009-10-21.
  65. Koivisto, M. Venäjän idea, Helsinki. Tammi. 2001


Books that support Soviet offensive plans existence

Books that reject existence of Soviet offensive plans

Neutral approach



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