Operation Spring Awakening

Operation Spring Awakening
Part of World War II, Eastern Front

German units during the Lake Balaton Offensive, March 1945
Date6–16 March 1945
LocationLake Balaton, Hungary
Coordinates: 46°59′N 18°21′E / 46.983°N 18.350°E / 46.983; 18.350
Result Soviet victory
Kingdom of Hungary (1920–46) Hungary
 Soviet Union
Democratic Federal Yugoslavia Yugoslav Partisans
Commanders and leaders
Nazi Germany Josef Dietrich
(6th SS Panzer Army)
Soviet Union Fyodor Tolbukhin
(3rd Ukrainian Front)
465,050 men[1] 431,000 men (initially)
700 AFVs[2]
Casualties and losses
German data:
Total casualties: 12,358
31 tanks[2]
Soviet data:
Total causalties: ~27,000
300 artillery and mortars
500 tanks
200 planes[3]
Total casualties: 32,889
8,492 killed and missing
24,407 wounded and sick[1]
152 tanks

Operation Frühlingserwachen ("Spring Awakening") (6 – 16 March 1945) was the last major German offensive of World War II. The offensive was launched in Hungary on the Eastern Front. This offensive was also referred to in Germany as the Plattensee Offensive, in the Soviet Union as the Balaton Defensive Operation (6 – 15 March 1945), and in English as the Lake Balaton Offensive.

The offensive begun by the Germans in great secrecy on 6 March 1945. They launched attacks in Hungary near the Lake Balaton area. This area included some of the last oil reserves still available to the Axis. The operation involved many German units withdrawn from the failed Ardennes Offensive on the Western Front, including the 6th SS Panzer Army. Almost inevitably, Operation Spring Awakening was a failure for the German Army.

German plan

German plan of attack

After the Ardennes offensive failed, in Hitler’s estimation, the Nagykanizsa oilfields southwest of Lake Balaton were the most strategically valuable reserves on the Eastern Front.[4] Hitler ordered Sepp Dietrich's 6th SS Panzer Army to take the lead and move to Hungary in order to protect the oilfields and refineries there.[5]

The Germans planned to attack against Soviet General Fyodor Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front.[6] The 6th SS Panzer Army was responsible for the primary thrust of the German attack. The army was to advance from an area north of Lake Balaton on a wide front. They were to push east through the Soviet 27th Army and to the Danube River. After reaching the river, one part of the army would turn north creating a northern spearhead. The northern spearhead would advance through the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Army and move along the Danube River to retake Budapest, which had been captured on 13 February 1945. Another part of 6th SS Panzer Army would then turn south and create a southern spearhead. The southern spearhead would move along the Sio Canal to link up with units from German Army Group E, which was to thrust north through Mohács. If successful, the meeting of the southern spearhead and of Army Group E would encircle both the Soviet 26th Army and the Soviet 57th Army.[6]

German 6th Army would keep the Soviet 27th Army engaged while it was surrounded. Likewise, the German 2nd Panzer Army would advance from an area south of Lake Balaton towards Kaposvár and keep the Soviet 57th Army engaged. The Hungarian Third Army was to hold the area north of the attack and to the west of Budapest.[6]

Soviet preparation

By the second half of February Soviet intelligence identified large German tank formations in western Hungary, and soon realized that preparation for a major offensive was underway.[6] Using the experience gained in the Battle of Kursk, the Soviets built multi-layered anti-tank defenses, using 65% of available artillery to create 66 anti-tank ambush points over 83 km of front in Lake Balaton area. The depth of the defense zone reached up to 25–30 km. To ensure sufficient supply of war materials and fuel, additional temporary bridges and gas pipelines were built on the Danube River.[6]

German attack

On 6 March 1945, the German 6th Army, joined by the 6th SS Panzer Army launched a pincer movement north and south of Lake Balaton. Ten panzer and five infantry divisions, including a large number of new heavy Tiger II tanks, struck 3rd Ukrainian Front, hoping to reach the Danube and link up with the German 2nd Panzer Army forces attacking south of Lake Balaton.[7] The attack was spearheaded by the 6th SS Panzer Army and included elite units such as the LSSAH division. Dietrich's army made "good progress" at first, but as they drew near the Danube, the combination of the muddy terrain and strong Soviet resistance ground them to a halt.[8]

By 14 March, Operation Spring Awakening was at risk of failure. The 6th SS Panzer Army was well short of its goals. The 2nd Panzer Army did not advance as far on the southern side of Lake Balaton as the 6th SS Panzer Army had on the northern side. Army Group E met fierce resistance from the Bulgarian First Army and Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavian partisan army, and failed to reach its objective of Mohács.

Soviet counterattack

Soviet counterattack

On 16 March, the Soviets forces counterattacked in strength. The Germans were driven back to the positions they had held before Operation Spring Awakening began.[9] The overwhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army made any defense impossible, yet Hitler somehow had believed victory was attainable.[10]

On 22 March, the remnants of the 6th SS Panzer Army withdrew towards Vienna. By 30 March, the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian Front crossed from Hungary into Austria. By 4 April, the 6th SS Panzer Army was already in the Vienna area desperately setting up defensive lines against the anticipated Soviet Vienna Offensive. Approaching and encircling the Austrian capital were the Soviet 4th Guards Tank Army, the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Army, the Soviet 9th Guards Army, and the Soviet 46th Army.[9]

The Soviet's Vienna Offensive ended with the fall of the city on 13 April. By 15 April, the remnants of the 6th SS Panzer Army were north of Vienna, facing the Soviet 9th Guards Tank Army and 46th Army.

By 15 April, the depleted German 6th Army was north of Graz, facing the Soviet 26th and 27th Armies. The remnants of the German 2nd Panzer Army were south of Graz in the Maribor area, facing the Soviet 57th Army and the Bulgarian First Army. Between 25 April and 4 May, the 2nd Panzer Army was attacked near Nagykanizsa during the Nagykanizsa–Körmend Offensive.

Some Hungarian units survived the fall of Budapest and the destruction which followed when the Soviets counterattacked after Operation Spring Awakening. The Hungarian Szent László Infantry Division was still indicated to be attached to the German 2nd Panzer Army as late as 30 April. Between 16 and 25 March, the Hungarian Third Army had been destroyed about 40 kilometres (25 mi) west of Budapest by the Soviet 46th Army which was driving towards Bratislava and the Vienna area.


German casualties

Operation Spring Awakening was a failure for Germany. Given the timing of the offensive and the relative strength of German forces compared to the Red Army, the plan was doomed from the start.[10]

This failure is known for the "armband order" that followed. The order was issued to the 6th SS Panzer Army commander Sepp Dietrich by Adolf Hitler, who claimed that the troops, and more importantly, the Leibstandarte, "did not fight as the situation demanded."[11] As a mark of disgrace, the Waffen-SS units involved in the battle were ordered to remove their treasured cuff titles. Dietrich did not relay the order to his troops.[8]

Order of battle

The Axis forces:

The Soviet forces:

See also

Soviet memorial today in Székesfehérvár



  1. 1 2 G.F. Krivosheyev, 'Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the twentieth century', London, Greenhill Books, 1997, ISBN 1-85367-280-7, Page 110
  2. 1 2 Frieser et al. 2007, pp. 942-943.
  3. Коллектив авторов. История Второй мировой войны. 1939—1945. — Т. 10. — М.: Воениздат, 1979.
  4. Duffy 2002, p. 293.
  5. Seaton 1971, p. 537.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 Higgins, David R. (2014). Jagdpanther vs SU-100. Eastern Front 1945. Osprey Publishing.
  7. Glantz & House 1995, p. 253.
  8. 1 2 Stein 1984, p. 238.
  9. 1 2 Dollinger 1967, p. 182.
  10. 1 2 Ziemke 1968, p. 450.
  11. Dollinger 1967, p. 198.


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