Middle power

Leaders of the G-20 countries and others present at the 2008 G-20 Washington summit. Most members of the G-20 are middle powers while some are great powers.

In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is not a superpower nor a great power, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition. The concept of the "middle power" dates back to the origins of the European state system. In the late 16th century, Italian political thinker Giovanni Botero divided the world into three types of states – grandissime (empires), mezano (middle powers) and piccoli (small powers). According to Botero, a mezano or middle power "...has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others."[1]


No agreed standard method defines which states are middle powers. Some researchers use Gross National Product (GNP) statistics to draw lists of middle powers around the world. Economically, middle powers are generally those that are not considered too "big" or too "small", however that is defined. Economics is not always the defining factor. Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally but did not dominate in any one area. This usage is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as regional powers. The international relations scholar Enrico Fels employs k-means clustering in order to identify six regional middle powers in Asia-Pacific based on a composite index that involves 54 indicators and covers the aggregated power base of 44 regional states.[2] Based on a Realist ontology he conducts mixed-method research to analyse these six regional middle powers' balancing and bandwagoning strategies in order to outline whether a relational power shift between China and the United States has taken place since the end of the Cold War.

According to academics at the University of Leicester and University of Nottingham:

Middle power status is usually identified in one of two ways. The traditional and most common way is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. Because countries' capabilities differ, they are categorized as superpowers (or great powers), middle powers or small powers. More recently, it is possible to discern a second method for identifying middle power status by focusing on behavioural attributes. This posits that middle powers can be distinguished from superpowers and smaller powers because of their foreign policy behaviour – middle powers carve out a niche for themselves by pursuing a narrow range and particular types of foreign policy interest. In this way middle powers are countries that use their relative diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability. Both measures are contested and controversial, though the traditional quantitative method has proved more problematic than the behavioural method.

According to Eduard Jordaan of Singapore Management University:

All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.[3]

According to Enrico Fels from the University of Bonn:

Firstly, just like great powers, middle powers must have sufficient control over material (and non-material) resources. Secondly, middle powers must be willing to exercise some form of responsibility in regional affairs, e.g. by successfully taking a diplomatic lead on important issue areas or using their means to shape other nations' behaviour in order to contribute to regional stability. Finally, with regards to security and related to the first first point, a middle power must be militarily self-sufficient enough to inflict great costs upon an actively aggressive great power. [4]

Another definition, by the Middle Power Initiative: "Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that give them significant international credibility."[5] Under this definition however, nuclear-armed states like India and Pakistan, and every state participant of the NATO nuclear sharing, would not be middle powers.

Middle power diplomacy

According to Laura Neak of the International Studies Association:

Although there is some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term middle power, middle powers are identified most often by their international behavior–called 'middle power diplomacy'—the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an idealistic imperative they associate with being a middle power. The imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great or principal powers. This imperative was particularly profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War.[6]

According to international relations scholar Annette Baker Fox, relationships between middle powers and great powers reveal more intricate behaviors and bargaining schemes than has often been assumed.[7] According to Soeya Yoshihide, "Middle Power does not just mean a state's size or military or economic power. Rather, 'middle power diplomacy' is defined by the issue area where a state invests its resources and knowledge. Middle Power States avoid a direct confrontation with great powers, but they see themselves as 'moral actors' and seek their own role in particular issue areas, such as human rights, environment, and arms regulations. Middle powers are the driving force in the process of transnational institutional-building." (Soeya Yoshihide)[8]

Characteristics of middle power diplomacy include:[8]

The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), a program of the Global Security Institute, highlights the importance of middle powers diplomacy. Through MPI, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily with middle power governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Middle power countries are particularly influential in issues related to arms control, being that they are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

Self-defined by nation states

The term first entered Canadian political discourse after World War II. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, for example called Canada "a power of the middle rank" and helped to lay out the classical definition of Canadian middle power diplomacy. When he was advocating for Canada's election to the United Nations Security Council, he said that while "...the special nature of [Canada's] relationship to the United Kingdom and the United States complicates our responsibilities", Canada was not a "satellite" of either but would "continue to make our decisions objectively, in the light of our obligations to our own people and their interest in the welfare of the international community."[10] Canadian leaders believed Canada was a middle power because it was a junior partner in larger alliances (e.g. NATO, NORAD), was actively involved in resolving disputes outside its own region (e.g. Suez Crisis), was not a former colonial power and therefore neutral in anti-colonial struggles, worked actively in the United Nations to represent the interests of smaller nations and to prevent the dominance of the superpowers (often being elected to the United Nations Security Council for such reasons), and because it was involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts around the world.

In March 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd defined his country's foreign policy as one of "middle power diplomacy", along the lines of similar criteria. Australia would "influence international decision-makers" on issues such as "global economic, security and environmental challenges".[11]

Middle power or great power?

The overlaps between the lists of middle powers and great powers show that there is no unanimous agreement among authorities.[12]

Nations such as France, Russia and the United Kingdom are generally considered to be great powers due to their military and strategic importance, their status as recognised nuclear powers and also their permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Some academics also believe that Germany and Japan are great powers, but due to their large advanced economies and global influence as opposed to military and strategic capabilities.[13] Italy also has seen much discussion among academics and commentators regarding its status as a great power,[14][15] particularly for its position in the G7 and the nations influence in regional and international organisations.[15][16] Although broad academic support for India as a great power is uncommon, recent years have seen some in the field of political science, such as Malik Mohan (2011) and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski (2012) put forward the assertion that India holds the status of a great power.[17][18]

Yet sources have at times referred to these nations as middle powers:

List of middle powers

As with the great powers, there is no unanimous agreement among authorities as to which countries are considered middle powers. Lists are often the subject of much debate and tend to place comparatively large countries (e.g. Brazil) alongside relatively smaller ones (e.g. Norway).[33] Clearly not all middle powers are of equal status; some are considered regional powers and members of the G20 (e.g. Australia), while others could very easily be considered small powers (e.g. the Czech Republic). Some larger middle powers also play important roles in the United Nations and other international organisations such as the WTO.

The following is a list of countries that have been, whether in the past or more recent, considered middle powers by academics or other experts:

See also


  1. Rudd K (2006) Making Australia a force for good, Labor eHerald Archived 27 June 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
  2. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 353-361. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  3. 1 2 Jordaan, Eduard (2003). "The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers". Politikon. 30 (1): 165–181. doi:10.1080/0258934032000147282.
  4. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 213. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  5. 1 2 Middle Powers Initiative (2004) Building Bridges: What Middle Power Countries Should Do To Strengthen the NPT, GSI
  6. Bishai LS (2000) From Recognition to Intervention: The Shift from Traditional to Liberal International Law Archived 28 February 2002 at the Wayback Machine.
  7. Fox, Annette Baker, The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States (Columbia University Press, 1977).
  8. 1 2 Yoshihide, Soeya. "Middle Power Diplomacy". Retrieved 2006. Check date values in: |access-date= (help)
  9. Patrick James; Mark J. Kasoff (2008). Canadian studies in the new millennium. University of Toronto Press. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-8020-9468-1. Retrieved 2016-02-24.
  10. H.H. Herstien, L.J. Hughes, R.C. Kirbyson. Challenge & Survival: The History of Canada (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 1970). p 411
  11. Shanahan D (2008) Time to go global, urges Rudd, The Australian
  12. Mehmet Ozkan. "A NEW APPROACH TO GLOBAL SECURITY: PIVOTAL MIDDLE POWERS AND GLOBAL POLITICS" Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs XI.1 (2006): 77-95
  13. Encarta - The Great Powers. Archived from the original on 1 November 2009.
  14. Canada Among Nations, 2004: Setting Priorities Straight. McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP. 17 January 2005. p. 85. ISBN 0773528369. Retrieved 13 June 2016. ("The United States is the sole world's superpower. France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom are great powers")
  15. 1 2 Sterio, Milena (2013). The right to self-determination under international law : "selfistans", secession and the rule of the great powers. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. p. xii (preface). ISBN 0415668182. Retrieved 13 June 2016. ("The great powers are super-sovereign states: an exclusive club of the most powerful states economically, militarily, politically and strategically. These states include veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia), as well as economic powerhouses such as Germany, Italy and Japan.")
  16. The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security. Routledge. 2 Jul 2010. ISBN 1136936076. Retrieved 11 June 2016. (see section on The G6/G7: great power governance)
  17. Strategic Vision: America & the Crisis of Global Power by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, pp 43–45. Published 2012.
  18. Malik, Mohan (2011). China and India: Great Power Rivals. United States: FirstForumPress. ISBN 1935049410.
  19. 1 2 P. Shearman, M. Sussex, European Security After 9/11(Ashgate, 2004) - According to Shearman and Sussex, both the UK and France were great powers now reduced to middle power status.
  20. Otte M, Greve J (2000) A Rising Middle Power?: German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989-1999, St. Martin's Press
  21. Sperling, James (2001). "Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War Europe". British Journal of Political Science. 31 (2). doi:10.1017/S0007123401000151.
  22. 1 2 3 4 Tobias Harris, 'Japan Accepts its "Middle-Power" Fate'. Far Eastern Economic Review Vol. 171, No. 6 (2008), p. 45: 'Japan is settling into a position as a middle power in Asia, sitting uneasily between the U.S., its security ally, and China, its most important economic partner. In this it finds itself in a situation similar to Australia, India, South Korea and the members of Asean.'
  23. Efstathopoulos, Charalampos (2011). "Reinterpreting India's Rise through the Middle Power Prism". Asian Journal of Political Science. 19 (1): 74–95. doi:10.1080/02185377.2011.568246. India's role in the contemporary world order can be optimally asserted by the middle power concept. The concept allows for distinguishing both strengths and weakness of India's globalist agency, shifting the analytical focus beyond material-statistical calculations to theorise behavioural, normative and ideational parameters.
  24. Robert W. Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy since 1971 (The Royal Institute for International Affairs, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), quoted in Leonard Stone, 'India and the Central Eurasian Space', Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2007, p. 183: 'The U.S. is a superpower whereas India is a middle power. A superpower could accommodate another superpower because the alternative would be equally devastating to both. But the relationship between a superpower and a middle power is of a different kind. The former does not need to accommodate the latter while the latter cannot allow itself to be a satellite of the former."
  25. Cartwright, Jan (2009). "India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?". Asian Survey. 49 (3): 403–428. doi:10.1525/as.2009.49.3.403. India’s democratic rhetoric has also helped it further establish its claim as being a rising "middle power." (A "middle power" is a term that is used in the field of international relations to describe a state that is not a superpower but still wields substantial influence globally. In addition to India, other "middle powers" include, for example, Australia and Canada.)
  26. Verbeek, Bertjan; Giacomello, Giampiero (2011). Italy's foreign policy in the twenty-first century : the new assertiveness of an aspiring middle power. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-4868-6.
  27. "Operation Alba may be considered one of the most important instances in which Italy has acted as a regional power, taking the lead in executing a technically and politically coherent and determined strategy." See Federiga Bindi, Italy and the European Union (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p. 171.
  28. "Italy plays a prominent role in European and global military, cultural and diplomatic affairs. The country's European political, social and economic influence make it a major regional power." See Italy: Justice System and National Police Handbook, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: International Business Publications, 2009), p. 9.
  29. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 507-566. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  30. Cox, Robert W. (1989). "Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order". International Journal. 44 (4): 823–862. doi:10.1177/002070208904400405.
  31. Soeya Yoshihide, 'Diplomacy for Japan as a Middle Power, Japan Echo, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2008), pp. 36-41.
  32. Neumann, Iver B. (2008). "Russia as a great power, 1815–2007". Journal of International Relations and Development. 11: 128–151 [p. 128]. doi:10.1057/jird.2008.7. As long as Russia's rationality of government deviates from present-day hegemonic neo-liberal models by favouring direct state rule rather than indirect governance, the West will not recognize Russia as a fully fledged great power.
  33. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Solomon S (1997) South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership Archived 26 April 2015 at the Wayback Machine., ISS
  34. 1 2 3 Wurst J (2006) Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper, GSI Archived 14 June 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
  35. 1 2 Cooper AF (1997) Niche Diplomacy - Middle Powers after the Cold War, palgrave
  36. 1 2 3 4 Bernard Wood, 'Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions', in Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension, edited by Cranford Pratt (Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).
  37. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 365-436. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  38. 1 2 Yasmi Adriansyah, 'Questioning Indonesia's place in the world', Asia Times (20 September 2011): 'Countries often categorized as middle power (MP) include Australia, Canada and Japan. The reasons for this categorization are the nations' advanced political-economic stature as well as their significant contribution to international cooperation and development. India and Brazil have recently become considered middle powers because of their rise in the global arena—particularly with the emerging notion of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China).'
  39. 1 2 3 4 Buzan, Barry (2004). The United States and the Great Powers. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press. p. 71. ISBN 0-7456-3375-7.
  40. Hazleton WA (2005) Middle Power Bandwagoning? Australia's Security Relationship with the United States, allacademic
  41. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy Golden Age of Middle Powers? Archived 4 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine., Adam Balcer, January 2012
  42. 1 2 Inoguchi K (2002) The UN Disarmament Conference in Kyote Archived 29 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
  43. Caplan G (2006) From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons learned?, SudanTribune
  44. 1 2 Heine J (2006) On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy, ISN Archived 7 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
  45. 1 2 Gladys Lechini, Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation. NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2007): 28-33: 'Today, a new, more selective South-South cooperation has appeared, bringing some hope to the people of our regions. The trilateral alliance known as the India, Brazil, and South Africa Dialogue Forum, or IBSA, exemplifies the trend … The three member countries face the same problems and have similar interests. All three consider themselves "middle powers" and leaders of their respective regions, yet they have also been subject to pressures from the North.'
  46. Daniel Flemes, Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspective of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Hamburg: GIGA, 2007.
  47. 1 2 3 4 Behringer, Ronald M. (2005). "Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda". Cooperation and Conflict. 40 (3): 305–342. doi:10.1177/0010836705055068.
  48. Crosby, Ann Denholm (1997). "A Middle-Power Military in Alliance: Canada and NORAD". Journal of Peace Research. 34 (1): 37–52. doi:10.1177/0022343397034001004. JSTOR 424829.
  49. Petersen K (2003) Quest to Reify Canada as a Middle Power, Dissident Voice
  50. "THE UN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN KYOTO". disarm.emb-japan.go.jp. Archived from the original on 16 January 2013. Retrieved 13 November 2015.
  51. Heine, Jorge. "On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy". The Centre for International Governance Innovation. Archived from the original on 2007-10-07. Retrieved 13 November 2015.
  52. 1 2 3 4 Pratt C (1990) Middle Power Internationalism, MQUP
  53. 1 2 3 4 Cooper, Andrew F.; Antkiewicz, Agata; Shaw, Timothy M. (2007). "Lessons from/for BRICSAM about South-North Relations at the Start of the 21st Century: Economic Size Trumps All Else?". International Studies Review. 9 (4): 673–689. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2007.00730.x.
  54. 1 2 Ploughshares Monitor (1997) Scrapping the Bomb: The role of middle power countries
  55. GILLEY, BRUCE (September 10, 2012). "The Rise of the Middle Powers". The New York Times Company. p. 1. Retrieved 14 March 2015.
  56. Thanos Veremēs (1997)The Military in Greek Politics "Black Rose Books"
  57. Higgott, Richard A.; Cooper, Andrew Fenton (1990). "Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations". International Organization. 44 (4): 589–632. doi:10.1017/S0020818300035414. JSTOR 2706854.
  58. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 697-747. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  59. 1 2 Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).
  60. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnesbusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Power in a Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 1997).
  61. Samhat, Nayef H. (2000). "Middle Powers and American Foreign Policy: Lessons for Irano-U.S. Relations, 1962–77". Policy Studies Journal. 28 (1): 11–26. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2000.tb02013.x.
  62. Ahouie M (2004) Iran Analysis Quarterly, MIT
  63. Foreign Affairs Committee (2006) Iran
  64. www.lrb.co.uk
  65. www.acronym.org.uk
  66. 1 2 Mace G, Belanger L (1999) The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism (p 153)
  67. Kim R. Nossal and Richard Stubbs, 'Mahathir's Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?' in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  68. Louis Belanger and Gordon Mace, 'Middle Powers and Regionalism in the Americas: The Cases of Argentina and Mexico', in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  69. 1 2 Pierre G. Goad, 'Middle Powers to the Rescue?', Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 163, No. 24 (2000), p. 69.
  70. Pellicer O (2006) Mexico – a Reluctant Middle Power?, FES
  71. Politics and Power in the Maghreb, Michael J. Willis (2012)
  72. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 437-505. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  73. Barry Buzan (2004). The United States and the great powers: world politics in the twenty-first century. Polity. pp. 71, 99. ISBN 978-0-7456-3374-9. Retrieved 27 December 2011.
  74. Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft, B.J.C. McKercher (2012), Page 189
  75. 1 2 3 4 5 Jonathan H. Ping Middle Power Statecraft (p 104)
  76. 1 2 Spero, Joshua (2004). Bridging the European Divide. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 206. ISBN 9780742535534. ISBN 0-7425-3553-3.
  77. Kirton J (2006) Harper’s Foreign Policy Success?
  78. 1 2 according to Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique, Larousse, 2009,p. 134, both Spain and Portugal exert a real influence in Africa and in the Americas.
  79. Cooper, Andrew F. "Middle Powers: Squeezed out or Adaptive?". Public Diplomacy Magazine. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
  80. Kamrava, Mehran. "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy" (PDF). Retrieved 12 March 2015.
  81. findarticles.com
  82. yaleglobal.yale.edu
  83. Peter Vale, 'South Africa: Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs', in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  84. Van Der Westhuizen, Janis (1998). "South Africa's emergence as a middle power". Third World Quarterly. 19 (3): 435–456. doi:10.1080/01436599814334.
  85. Pfister R (2006) The Apartheid Republuc and African States, H-Net
  86. Jordaan, Eduard (August 2008). "Barking at the Big Dogs: South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East". The Round Table. 97 (397): 547–559. doi:10.1080/00358530802207344.
  87. Flemes, Daniel, Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum (August 1, 2007). GIGA Working Paper No. 57. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1007692
  88. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 567-635. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  89. Armstrong DF (1997) South Korea's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era: A middle power perspective
  90. Rozman, Gilbert (2007). "South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry: a middle power's options within the East Asian core triangle". The Pacific Review. 20 (2): 197–220. doi:10.1080/09512740701306840.
  91. Woosang Kim, 'Korea as a Middle Power in Northeast Asian Security, in The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order, edited by G. John Ikenbgerry and Chung-in Moon (Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
  92. Sheridan, Greg (27 November 2008). "The plucky country and the lucky country draw closer". The Australian.
  93. Shin, Soon-ok (2016). "South Korea's elusive middlepowermanship: regional or global player?". The Pacific Review. 29 (2): 187–209. doi:10.1080/09512748.2015.1013494.
  94. Rudengren J, Gisle P, Brann K (1995) Middle Power Clout: Sweden And The Development Banks
  95. Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 637-695. ISBN 978-3-319-45689-8. Retrieved 2016-11-25.
  96. Meltem Myftyler and Myberra Yyksel, 'Turkey: A Middle Power in the New Order', in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  97. Laipson, Ellen (3 September 2014). "The UAE and Egypt's New Frontier in Libya". The National Interest. Retrieved 26 October 2014.
  98. Evans, Gareth (29 June 2011). "Middle Power Diplomacy". Retrieved 26 October 2014.

Further reading

This article is issued from Wikipedia - version of the 12/4/2016. The text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share Alike but additional terms may apply for the media files.